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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the drafting process for the Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and Judgments. It will be demonstrated why the original goal of a broad
treaty was given up in favor of a draft convention that only applies in international cases
to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil and commercial matters in the
business-to-business setting. The reader will get an understanding of how the
participating nations and interest groups influenced the negotiations and modified the
outcome of the discussions. Special consideration was given to the matters of intellectual
property and e-commerce, which were nearly completely excluded from the scope of the
present draft. The thesis concludes that the project can only succeed if it includes
business-to-consumer e-commerce transaction issues and intellectual property rights.
Without the inclusion of these matters into the scope of the Hague Convention, it will
lose further importance and face the danger of becoming obsolete.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario which could have taken place a decade ago: Two scholars
of Private International Law have a discussion about the biggest challenge this field of
law has to face in the future. There could have been a lot of different issues both scholars
would have come up with. Even though it is difficult and highly speculative to guess
which of the issues deserved the most attention, it can certainly be assumed that a
convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments, which is universally acceptable and
aplicable was at the top of their list. In 1994, the Hague Conference decided to take up
this work in order to draft such a unifying treaty. The project was soon known as the
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters. This thesis will analyze this project. A future Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments
Convention is a great opportunity to unify the law in a field which is not only of legal
interest but has great ramifications on the legal systems and will affect individuals
everywhere.
Although a final Hague Convention on this matter is not yet in force, the outcome
seems to be foreseeable. The objective of this thesis is to connect the history of the
negotiation process of the proposed Hague Convention with the discussion of its final
content in order to provide an understanding of a future result. The thesis will analyze
how the influence of the major negotiating parties, namely the United States and Europe,
changed the scope of the Convention in the course of the negotiations. The thesis will
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describe why, in the end, the United States only agreed to a convention that solely
covered exclusive choice of court agreements in civil or commercial matters instead of
adopting a treaty similar to the Brussels Regulation.
Special considerations will be given to matters of intellectual property and ecommerce. These two areas were chosen because they play a prominent role since the
increasing use of the internet, as one example, has led to a heightened importance of
intellectual property matters and e-commerce. This thesis will endeavor to explain
whether and how the proposed convention covers these two issues. Each respective
approach will be analyzed and compared with other possible approaches. The influence
of the negotiating parties on the final outcome will also be analyzed in this context.
Following the introduction in Part I, Part II of this thesis will describe the history
of the Hague Convention project. This will include a description of what the Hague
Conference actually is, prior attempts by the Hague Conference on the same subject, and
the existing framework regarding jurisdiction and judgments in Europe and in the United
States. A detailed description of the history of the negotiations itself is also included. The
different perspectives of the most important negotiating parties will try to give an
understanding for the way the different delegations developed and influenced the
discussions. Part III examines the structure and the scope of the Preliminary Draft
Convention and the first complete draft on the subject issued by the Hague Conference.
The structural portion concentrates on the question of what a mixed convention style is
and which advantages such an approach has compared to single and double convention
schemes. Next, the scope of the Preliminary Draft Convention will be examined chapter
by chapter since this draft was the archetype for the following negotiation and discussion
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processes. Part IV concentrates on the development of the project during and after the
June 2001 Diplomatic Conference. Changes in the convention text, new approaches and
the latest developments will be investigated. Part V deals with the preparations that were
made for the June 2005 Diplomatic Conference. It provides a detailed description of the
key provisions of the April 2004 Draft which is the most recent draft issued by the Hague
Conference. Part VI deals with the special consideration of intellectual property and ecommerce issues in the discussion, which reiterates the importance of the negotiation
process. However, this time it is looked upon from the viewpoint of intellectual property
and e-commerce. The issue of consumer protection receives special consideration in the
section on e-commerce since both fields are inseparably connected. A number of
approaches in various countries as well as different positions in the negotiations will be
described before a final conclusion is drawn in Part VII of the thesis.
The thesis will conclude that the negotiating parties are proceeding in the right
direction by drafting, signing, and ratifying a treaty that only covers exclusive choice of
court agreements in civil and commercial matters in the business-to-business setting if
more controversial issue will be added later. The adding of the so-called second stage
issues is of major importance for the success of the project in the long run.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF THE PROJECT

A. The Hague Conference
On 12 September 1893, the Dutch government called a conference, with the intention of
concentrating primarily on family law and succession,1 and the unification of rules of
private international law.2 Thirteen states accepted the invitation and sent their
government representatives to The Hague, not only in 1893 but also in 1894, 1900, and
1904.3 The loose structure of this conference was given a firm legal basis after World
War II by an agreement made between 16 European states and Japan.4 In October 1951,
these states affirmed the usage established by the Dutch government since 1893 and
indicated permanent character of the conference by giving it the name: “The Hague
Conference on Private International Law.”5 Currently, the Hague Conference is an
intergovernmental organization with sixty two member states, which include all
European Union member states and the United States.6 According to Article 1 of its

1

2

3
4
5

6

See Kurt Lipstein, One Hundred Years of Hague Conference on Private International Law, 42 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 553, 557 (1993).
See Kurt H. Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law, A
History with Comments, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 292 (1965).
See supra note 1.
See id. at 558.
Id. For a summary of the work of the Hague Conference, see id. at 553; for general information on The
Hague Conference see http://www.hcch.net.
Membership as of January 21, 2005: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname,
Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela; for a detailed list
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Statute the Hague Conference is organized to promote “the progressive unification of the
rules of private international law.”7 Conferences are called every four years, but
extraordinary sessions are possible as well. In its history, the Hague Conference dealt
with the topics of procedure, family matters, succession, commercial matters, torts and
conflict of laws.8 The United States has been a member since 15 October 1964.9 The
Hague Conference, with its member states on all continents, seems to offer a solid basis
for conventions for the unification of law in certain fields not only regionally, but also
worldwide. Thus, the interest in an instrument unifying the law with respect to
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments that would be universally acceptable brought
the negotiating parties to The Hague. But is the goal of a universally applicable and
workable convention in this field achievable and realistic? What would be an alternative
to a Hague Conference Convention?
Negotiations within the Hague regime require multiple levels of compromise from
its members. On the one hand is the U.S. and its abstinence from any treaty unifying rules
of jurisdiction and enforcement. On the other hand are the nations which adhere to the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions.10 In terms of experience, both sides have a long

7

8
9

10

of all 64 Member States see http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing (last visited January
21, 2005).
The text of the Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law is available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=29 (last visited January 21, 2005).
See supra note 1 at 559.
See http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.details&sid=76 (last visited January 21, 2005); for
general information regarding the U.S. participation in the Hague Conference see Peter H. Pfund &
Georg Taft, Congress’ Role in the International Unification of Private Law, 16 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
671 (1986). Peter H. Pfund, of the Office of the Legal Advisor at the Department of State, Office of
Private International Law, has provided periodic reports on the work of that office. See, e.g., Peter H.
Pfund, International Unification of Private Law: A Report on U.S. Participation 1987-88, 22 INT’L
LAW 1157 (1988); Peter H. Pfund, Annual Report, International Unification of Private Law: A Report
on United States Participation, 20 INT’L LAW 623 (1986). For historical information see Elliott E.
Cheatham & Harold G. Maier, Private International Law and its Sources, 22 VAND. L. REV. 27 (1968);
Kurt H. Nadelmann, supra note 2.
See infra part II.B.2.
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history of dealing with international civil procedure. But what about smaller nations with
less experience in such matters? Negotiations within the limits of the Hague Conference
would, undoubtedly, mean that such inexperienced nations would be involved in the
process of finding an agreement. Some authors hold the view that their involvement
would not only complicate such an agreement process, but would rather make the
bargaining of a final text nearly impossible.11 This thought led some academics to suggest
that bilateral negotiations exclusively between the U.S. and Europe could achieve a
reasonable result more efficiently, since they displayed common interests and similar
social, political and economic cultures.12 While this argument admittedly has substance, a
very important question arises nonetheless. Should not the opportunity to involve more
inexperienced nations be worth the associated risk of more complicated negotiations? In
the opinion supported in this thesis, the answer to this question is a clear yes. The only
situation in which the suggestion of bilateral discussions should be considered is if the
current Hague project fails due to circumstances not involved with the differences
between the US and European legal systems. In that case, such problems could not be
resolved in a bilateral setting either.

B. Previous Attempts and Existing Framework
Before analyzing the new attempts regarding the unification of private international law,
it seems useful to emphasize the existing framework.

11

12

For such a pessimistic view see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE
QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS, ESSAYS ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (1996); see also
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111, 121 (1998).
See, e.g., Juenger, id at 121.
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1. Previous Attempts for Unification
Work on unifying the law regarding jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments is not a
new matter for the Hague Conference. In 1969, the first attempts of unification were
made by concluding both the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters13 and the Convention on the Recognition of
Divorces and Legal Separations.14 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters came into effect on February 1,
1971. However, the treaty faced problems that made it impossible for this convention to
survive. Only Cyprus, The Netherlands, Portugal and Kuwait became parties, but none of
them ever deposited the bilateral agreements that were, according to the convention,
necessary to make the treaty operable.15 The later convention, the Divorce Recognition
Convention, turned out to be just as unsuccessful since only eighteen countries, mostly
European, ratified or acceded to it.16 Even though these early attempts were not
successful, it was clear that unification in the fields of jurisdiction and enforcement could
offer great benefits in various ways. However, an agreement had yet to be achieved not
only within Europe, but in other parts of the world. What followed were unification
attempts between countries that had at least similar interests and legal backgrounds.

13

14

15

16

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law (Feb. 1, 1971), reprinted in 15 AM. J. COMP.
L. 362 (1967), also available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=78 (last
visited January 21, 2005).
Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, Hague Conference on Private
International Law (June 1, 1970), reprinted in 8 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 31 (1969), also available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=80 (last visited January 21, 2005).
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, supra note 13, art. 28.
A list of all the countries that have ratified or acceded to the treaty is available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=80 (last visited January 21, 2005).
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2. Unification in the EU
A close look at the various approaches of European countries regarding the jurisdiction
issue is enough to understand why unification within the EU is more than reasonable and
finds common interest. For example, in order to find jurisdiction over a non-resident, it is
enough to base this solely on assets located in the forum according to Germany’s Law of
Civil Procedure.17 By contrast, the French Civil Code18 allows national courts to hear
nearly any case were the plaintiff is French, regardless of whether the person in question
is a resident or not.19 Moreover, a French defendant can insist on being sued in his own
country, and French courts will not enforce a judgment against him provided he has not
consented to a foreign jurisdiction.20
In order to protect their citizens against extraterritorial reach and to achieve
predictability, the six original member states of the European Economic Community
(EEC) decided to unify their laws of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments by
adopting the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.21 The importance of the Brussels
Convention is reflected in Article 63 of the Convention which requires that any state
becoming a member of the European Community must become a party to the Brussels

17
18
19
20
21

§ 23 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO).
Code Civil.
C. civ. art. 14.
Id. art. 15.
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 (consolidated and updated version of the 1968 Convention
and the Protocol of 1971, following the 1996 accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden) [hereinafter Brussels Convention], also available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/c_027/c_02719980126en00010033.pdf
(last visited January 21, 2005).
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Convention.22 Consequently, the Brussels Convention has also become effective in all
member states that joined the European Union. The idea behind this convention was to
take another step towards the unified market among the several European countries.23
However, the Brussels Convention lost its importance on May 1, 1999, when the
Amsterdam Treaty24 became effective for the European Union member states. According
to this treaty, the competence for coordination of internal rules on jurisdiction and
recognition of judgments now lay with the Community institutions. The institutions acted
on the new possibility immediately. The Council issued Council Regulation (EC) No.
44/2001,25 a Community regulation that replaced the Brussels Convention. While the
numbering of the articles has changed, the regulation contains rules that are substantially
similar to the Brussels Convention, providing a comprehensive approach to jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. The general jurisdictional pillars can
be summarized as follows: Both the convention and the regulation set forth that persons
domiciled in a member state may be sued in the courts of another member state. As far as
commercial contracts are concerned the proper forum can normally be found in the
“place of performance of the obligation in question.”26 In tort cases, “the place where the

22

23

24

25

26

Brussels Convention, id. art. 63. However, the rules set forth in the Brussels Convention were not
codified directly into the member states statutory systems. Member states were required to enact laws
that gave effect to the objective of the Brussels Convention.
See Sean D. Murphy, Negotiation of Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, 95 AM.
J. INT’L. L. 418, 419 (2001).
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties establishing the European
Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997).
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of Dec. 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter Brussels
Regulation or Council Regulation No. 44/2001], also available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_012/l_01220010116en00010023.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005). The
Council Regulation No. 44/2001 was finalized on Dec. 22, 2000, and became effective on March 1,
2002. The Regulation does not apply in Denmark. Council Regulation No. 44/2001, pmbl. ¶21.
However, Denmark continues to be subject to the Brussels Treaty vis-a-vis the other European Union
member states. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 22.
Brussels Convention, supra note 21, art. 5 (1); Brussels Regulation, supra note 25, art. 5 (1)(a).
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harmful event occurred” determines the proper jurisdiction.27 If a person is one among a
bigger number of defendants he may sue “where any of them is domiciled.”28 In a
consumer contract setting, the consumer has the choice between an action in his domicile
or in that of the supplier. The supplier on the other hand is only able to bring an action in
the consumers domicile.29
The European Union has also adopted the Lugano Convention,30 which
incorporates the ideas of the Brussels Convention and makes an effort to include nonmember states into the common European Union jurisdiction and recognition practice.
The EU stated that the convention was “open to accession by [...] other States which have
been invited to accede upon a request made by one of the Contracting States to the
depository State.”31 That no non-European state has requested accession so far is due to
the fact that such a state may only adhere if the existing parties to the Lugano Convention
unanimously agree to its participation.32 Such an agreement is difficult to obtain,
however, since the approaches in terms of jurisdiction and recognition in most of the
important non-European Union trading partners are quite different.33

27
28
29

30

31
32
33

Brussels Convention, id., art. 5 (3); Brussels Regulation, id., art. 5 (3).
Brussels Convention, id., art. 6(1); Brussels Regulation, id., art. 6(1).
Brussels Convention, id., art. 14; Brussels Regulation, id., art. 16(1) and (2). Art. 13 of the Brussels
Convention and Art. 15 of the Brussels Regulation determine which contracts qualify as consumer
contracts. Brussels Convention, id., art. 13; Brussels Regulation, id., art. 15.
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1989
O.J. (L 319) 9 reprinted in 28 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
Id. art. 62(1)(b).
Id.
Apart from that there is a limited significance of the Lugano Convention since recent accession by most
of the EFTA states to the EU will bring them within the scope of the Brussels Convention or the
Council Regulation No. 44/2001.
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3. United States
The United States neither ratified the conventions prepared by the Hague Conference34
nor is it a party to any treaty on the recognition of judgments.35 Despite this, there have
been some attempts by the United States to unify the law in this field. An earlier effort in
the 1970s to negotiate a judgments convention between the United States and the United
Kingdom failed, partially, because of the British government opposition to recognize
U.S. antitrust judgments36 and because of opposition by the U.K. insurance industry.37
The British insurance companies were afraid of the enforcement of extensive U.S. jury
verdicts, punitive damage awards, and antitrust remedies against them in the U.K.38
Against this background, the importance of successful negotiations of a Hague
Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention becomes obvious: such a convention would be
the first one with the United States as a party.

C. The History of the Negotiations
1. Different Starting Points
First, the problems that the delegations faced and the background for the negotiations will
be discussed before dealing with the actual negotiations. The European countries entered
the negotiations with a great advantage. There was no doubt among academics and
practitioners that the Brussels Convention worked so well that the adoption of the parallel
34
35

36

37
38

See supra part II.B.1.
See Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and the Preliminary Hague
Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, 62 U. PITT L. REV. 581, 582 (2001); see also Murphy, supra
note 23 at 419.
See P.M. North, The Draft U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 219, 231 (1979).
See Murphy, supra note 23 at 419.
See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 141, 174
(2001); see also Juenger, supra note 11 at 113.
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Lugano Convention by the remaining European Free Trade Association nations was an
expected consequence.39 The fact that this treaty is a well – functioning arrangement on a
day – to – day basis, since neither linguistic nor legal barriers can bar the relatively low
priced enforcement of domestic judgments in other member state countries,40 puts into
question whether there was a need for a broader convention for these countries.
Important in this context is the fact that the European Court of Justice has
rendered about 90 decisions that dealt with problems how to interpret the Brussels
Convention.41 These decisions are a further contribution to the clarification of the
Brussels Convention regime and make it more dependable, workable and fully
developed. These facts are a strong bargaining tool for the European countries. It is
probable and thoroughly understandable that they will not be willing to give away much
of their well – functioning system, since most of their major trading partners are already
included in the existing recognition regime.
By contrast, the U.S. starting point for negotiations on a future Hague Convention
is somewhat different. In the United States system there is no clear and rational catalog of
jurisdictional bases. Regardless of the fact that civil law and even most of the common
law countries can show a catalog of jurisdictional bases,42 the United States system has to

39

40

41

42

See Juenger, supra note 11 at 116 (conferring to the Brussels Convention as the “the single most
important private international law treaty in history“).
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1038 (1995) (stating
that the practice under the Brussels Convention is even “smother, more efficient, and more satisfactory”
than American interstate recognition and enforcement).
See Paul R. Beaumont, A United Kingdom Perspective on the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention,
24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 75, 89 (1998). For brief commentary on all those cases see Appendix 2 to
ALEXANDER E. ANTON & PAUL R. BEAUMONT, CIVIL JURISDICTION IN SCOTLAND: BRUSSELS AND
LUGANO CONVENTIONS 429-592 (2d. ed. 1995).
See, e.g., Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (England); Supreme Court Rules 1970, part 10
(N.S.W., Australia).
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rely on state long arm statutes and Supreme Court case law that is often incoherent.43 The
landmark court case on this issue is International Shoe Co. v. Washington,44 which sets
forth the basic principles regarding jurisdiction over legal persons in the U.S. system.
Even over 50 years after this important decision, it is still not totally clear what are the
correct guidelines for determining general jurisdiction in the United States.45 Even the
Supreme Court has difficulty figuring out a terminology looking at prior Supreme Court
decisions if one compares decisions made by same justices in different cases.46 Because
of all these reasons, the American jurisdictional law has been referred to as “not fit for
export.”47
Under normal circumstances, these facts suggest that the negotiating power of the
U.S. is not very strong since the U.S. delegation would not have much to contribute. The
U.S. delegation has made clear on several occasions that negotiations about their present
system of jurisdictional law is nearly impossible for them. Their hands are tied, so the
U.S. delegation states, since the case law established by the U.S. Supreme Court is nonnegotiable. The Supreme Court Justices have imposed their mandates as a matter of
constitutional law. Although one author describes the position to be “regrettable,”48 there
is a reason for the U.S. delegation taking such a position. Ever since 1877 with the case
of Pennoyer

43
44
45

46

47
48
49

v. Neff,49 the Supreme Court has set clear that all its disclosures are

Juenger, supra note 11 at 117.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). For a critical view
on the American jurisdictional concept, see Symposium, Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and
Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1995).
Compare, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 note 10
(1982) (White, J.) (discussing minimum contacts analysis), with Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (White, J.) (discussing also minimum contacts analysis).
Juenger, supra, note 40 at 1038.
See id. at 1037.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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controlled by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.50 The Due Process
Clause puts certain limits on the extension of jurisdiction over defendants that have no
substantial link to the forum. Therefore, it seems difficult for the United States to accept
certain grounds of jurisdiction without conflicting with the rules in the U.S. Constitution.
Tort jurisdiction based solely on the place of the injury are as hard to imagine as contract
jurisdiction based solely on the place of performance. But these bases of jurisdiction are
exactly what the nations applying the Brussels or Lugano Convention rely on.
Despite the US’s supposedly inflexible position at the beginning of the
negotiations, it was still untimely to predict whether or not the US would compromise on
any of its established rules or approaches. If the U.S. delegation showed some willingness
to shorten but in no case to lengthen the domestic long arm, or if it failed to recognize
foreign judgments that did not fit within the limits of the Due Process jurisprudence
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, they are disregarding the concerns of their
negotiating partners in civil law countries. Jurisdiction based on doing business or
minimum contacts, which in Europe are often considered vague and unpredictable, are at
least as unfamiliar to Brussels Convention members as their jurisdictional rules are for
the U.S. This and the fact that the European countries already have a well functioning
jurisdiction and recognition system also makes it difficult for them to accommodate their
rules and policies to any changes. Whether this led the delegations of the European
countries to the conclusion that their “hands are bound” as well is not clear. Thus, the
starting point for the negotiations seemed to be the following one: both major negotiating
parties would not be willing to lose large parts of their systems. The European Union
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applying a functioning system appeared to have more to offer and was unlikely to change
a substantial number of their rules. On the other hand, the U.S. could not present a system
that would work both among the several states within in the U.S. and also among the U.S.
and other nations. However, the U.S. would still control or at least influence the
negotiations at least as much as the European delegations. What they had to offer was
apparent – without the participation of the economically powerful U.S. there will not be a
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, since the goal of the
Hague Conference was to construct a universally acceptable treaty.

2. The Negotiations Prior to the 2001 Draft
In May 1992, Edwin Williamson, then Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State
took the step that would be referred to as the original source of all the subsequent
negotiations to the project here discussed. He wrote the Secretary General of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law proposing that the Conference take up the
negotiation of a convention that regulates recognition and enforcement of judgments on a
multinational basis.51 The first response to this letter came in May 1993 when the
Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference convened to discuss Mr. Williamson’s
proposition further through a session of a Special Commission.52 The Special
Commission of the Hague Conference met in June of 1994, and determined that it would
be “advantageous to draw up a convention on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement
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Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor , U.S. Department of State, to Georges Droz, Secretary
General, Hague Conference of Private International Law (May 5, 1992) (distributed with Hague
Conference document L.c. ON No.2 (93), at 3 (Jan. 4, 1993)).
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session 10 to 29 May
1993, Final Act of the Seventeenth Session, First Part, Miscellaneous Matters, at 43 (1995).
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of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.”53 It was further recommended that
this issue be included in the agenda for the eighteenth session of the Hague Conference in
order to consider it for the future work of the Conference.54 In June of 1995 another very
similar recommendation was made by the Special Commission on General Affairs and
Policy of the Conference. It also suggested that the proposals for a judgments convention
should be adopted as one of the agenda items for the Eighteenth Session of the Hague
Conference.55 At its Eighteenth Session, which was held from September 30 to October
19, 1996, the Hague Conference followed these suggestions. As part of the Final Act of
the Eighteenth Session, the represented nations voted to include in the Agenda of the
Nineteenth Session the question of “jurisdiction, and recognition, and enforcement of
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.”56
After all that work it was time for the first formal negotiations and the beginning
of the preparatory work on a convention on international jurisdiction and the effects of
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters at a two week meeting of the Special
Commission in June 1997.57 In March 1998, the following session of the Special
Commission was held, but no official document containing draft language was issued
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Conclusion of the Special Commission of June 1994 on the Question of the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal_affairs/judgments_94.html (last
visited January 21, 2005). Prel. Doc. No.1 (Jan.4, 1994).
Id.
Conclusions of the Special Commission of June 1995 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference,
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No.9, at 31 (Dec. 1995).
Eighteenth Session Final Act, Hague Conference on Private International Law, October 19, 1996, at 21;
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session 30 September
to 19 October 1996, Final Act of the Eighteenth Session, First Part, Miscellaneous Matters, at 47
(1999).
See Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of June 1997 on
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Preliminary
Document
No.
8
(November
1997),
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd8.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005).
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during and after this session. However, after a meeting from November 10 to November
20, 1998, the Drafting Committee presented the first document that contained draft
language.58 The first draft provisions dealt with various issues such as the scope of the
convention, the required bases of jurisdiction, provisional and protective matters,
prohibited grounds of jurisdiction, lis pendens, declining jurisdiction (forum non
conveniens), rules of recognition, legal aid, and damages.59 The Conference worked on
this Committee Draft for two weeks in June 1999 and one week in October of 1999. At
the meeting in October 1999, after five sessions, consisting of eighty-six meetings,60 the
Special Commission adopted a Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, and released the text to the public.61
The Nineteenth Session of the Hague Conference was scheduled for the fall of
2000.62 The plan was to discuss the Preliminary Draft Convention at this Diplomatic
Conference.63 In the weeks following the fifth and final session of the Special
Commission in October 1999, however, doubts arose as to whether one year was enough
time to consider the Special Commission’s draft.64 Apart from that objection, the draft
was faced with widespread, virulent criticism. In the eyes of the critics, the Preliminary
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Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Work. Doc. No. 144 E
(November 20, 1998) [hereinafter Committee Draft].
Id.
See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of
Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 191, 191 (2001). As already mentioned two week sessions took place in June 1997, June
1998, November 1998, and June 1999; the final session in October 1999, lasted ten days.
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Oct. 30, 1999, 15 U.S.T. 2228, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_drafte.pdf (last
visited January 21, 2005) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft Convention or Preliminary Draft]; for detailed
information see infra part III.
See Brand, supra note 35 at 586.
See supra note 60 at 191.
Id.
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Draft Convention failed to address whether, and in what manner intellectual property
rights and electronic commerce should be covered by the convention.65
Moreover, another concern was raised by different delegations. The Diplomatic
Session procedures were criticized for not being suitable for negotiating a convention that
could be universally accepted.66 The procedural rules for the Diplomatic Sessions set
forth a majoritarian principle, which did not encourage the reaching of consensus through
compromise.67 These problems prompted Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for
Private International Law at the U.S. State Department and Head of the U.S. Delegation,
to write to J. Hans A. van Loon, Secretary General of the Hague Conference.68 In his
letter, dated February 22, 2000, Kovar addressed the concerns of the U.S. Delegation by
stating that the Preliminary Draft Convention “stands no chance of being accepted in the
United States.”69 Therefore, he proposed (1) changes in the normal scheduling policy
regarding the Diplomatic Conferences in order to get “a much more open-ended schedule
of work” and (2) a change regarding the procedural negotiation rules with the aim of
achieving “more consensus-based negotiating methods.”70 This letter was a very
important turning point for the further development of the negotiation process. The
Hague Conference, aware of the importance of the project, decided to reschedule the
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See id. at 192.
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Id.
Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Asst. Legal Advisor for Private International Law, U.S. State Dept., to
Hans A. Van Loon (Feb. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/hague/kovar2loon22022000.pdf (last visited January 21, 2005).
“[T]he project as currently embodied in the October 1999 preliminary draft convention stands no
chance of being accepted in the United States. Moreover, our assessment is that the negotiating process
so far demonstrates no foreseeable possibility for correcting what for us are fatal defects in the
approach, structure, and details of the text. In our view there has not been adequate progress toward
creation of a draft convention that would represent a worldwide compromise among extremely different
legal systems.“
See supra note 68.

19
Diplomatic Conference and adjusted the procedural rules under which the Preliminary
Draft Convention would be considered.71 In May 2000, the Special Commission on
General Affairs and Policy decided to split the Diplomatic Conference into two parts, the
first being scheduled in June 2001, and the second at a later date to be announced.72
Furthermore, a consensus, rather than a majority negotiation process was to be applied at
these and all subsequent meetings.73 In addition it was decided to schedule informal
sessions between May 2000 and June 2001 to guarantee a reasonable basis and support
for the work of the Diplomatic Conference.74
A worldwide effort had begun to work on the Preliminary Draft Convention
almost immediately after its release.75 The drafters and other experts alike were aiming to
improve the text.76

3. The Role of the U.S. in the Negotiations
While the different starting points prior to the negotiations of the Hague project were
described earlier, this part of the thesis addresses the role that the U.S. played in the
negotiations and the reasons for the actions that it took.
As mentioned above, it was the initiative of the United States Department of
State, represented by Legal Advisor Edwin Williamson, that set the stage for the
negotiations and the later draft. The U.S. also urged more discussions on the Preliminary
71
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74
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See Brand supra note 35 at 586.
The relevant part of the May 2000 decision is repeated in The Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Informational note on the work of the informal meetings held since October 1999 to
consider and develop drafts on outstanding items, Preliminary Document No. 15 (May 2001) at 1,
available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd15e.doc.
Id.
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See Marc E. Hankin, Comment: Now that We Know “The Way Forward“, Let Us Stay the Course, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2002).
See id.
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Draft Convention and thus broadened the entire negotiation process. Considering that the
U.S. is not a party to any convention or other agreement on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments and against the background that the U.S. delegation
regarded their “hands to be bound” prior to the negotiation phase, this initiative seems
surprising. Was this only a simple wish to be a party of the convention in order to achieve
further unification and fully integrated markets, or can more specific reasons be found?
To answer this question, it is helpful to look at the U.S. Constitution. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution77 ensures that judgments from one state
are enforceable in every other state. The idea expressed by this rule has long been
referred to as the basic requirement towards fully integrated markets within the United
States.78 Although the U.S. is not a party to any of the conventions in the field, it has
made efforts to enforce foreign country judgments. Over 100 years ago in Hilton v.
Guyot,79 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that foreign country judgments that are
considered to have a reliable legal system should be enforceable both in federal and in
state courts under the common law.80 The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act81 subsequently strengthened this position. As a result foreign country
money judgments are often enforced in the United States.82
This fact alone does not help to answer the original question. It may help to take a
look at the situation U.S. judgment holders are faced with when trying to enforce their
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Murphy, supra note 23 at 418.
159 U.S. 113 (1895).
See id.; see also Murphy, supra note 23 at 419.
The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986 & 2000 Supp.).
Whereas the court in Hilton suggested the requirement of reciprocity in the judgment rendering country,
this requirement is not longer a part of most state law.
See Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issues for the Hague Judgments Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L
LAW 157, 157 (1998); see also Juenger, supra note 11 at 113-114.
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judgments abroad. The fact that even countries that are not a party to any enforcement
and recognition treaty usually enforce foreign judgments with the exception of those
rendered in the U.S.83 is alarming for U.S. judgment holders. In the eyes of the foreign
countries reasons for not doing so are excessive jury awards, the reach of United States
long – arm jurisdiction, and punitive damages.84 This perspective allows a better
understanding of the interest of the United States in creating a Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and Judgments. From the American perspective the idea is to give U.S.
litigants the same benefit foreign litigants enjoy, namely the enforcement of domestic
judgments abroad in foreign jurisdictions.

83
84

See Murphy, supra note 23 at 419.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION

When the first complete draft was issued in October 1999,85 not everyone expected that
another period of further negotiations lay before the Hague Conference and the various
delegations. To understand the dispute and the subsequent process of negotiation, the
following comments will introduce the first draft, which was used as the fundamental
basis of drafts to follow.

A. The Structure of the Preliminary Draft Convention
The drafting of a universal convention on the subject jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments was difficult, as was proved by the first disputes that occurred regarding basic
issues like the scope of a future convention. Different opinions also arose on whether the
text should be drafted in the style of a double or a mixed convention.86

1. Single and Double Conventions
A single convention format only regulates indirect jurisdiction and implies a weak sense
of interdependence.87 Therefore, the single convention idea is best applicable in settings
that lack strong political and economical commitments.88 Both the earlier conventions
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See supra part II.C.
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Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections On The Design Of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J.
INT’L. L. 17 (1998).
See Von Mehren, supra note 60 at 197.
See id. at 198.
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prepared by the Hague Conference on the subject89 were set forth in a single convention
style.
In the negotiations for the present Hague project the majority of the European
states favored the approach of a double convention.90 Such an approach would regulate
both direct and indirect jurisdiction.91 This type of convention creates uniform rules
regarding the required and prohibited bases of jurisdiction that the national courts in the
different countries may exercise.92 In other words, it sets forth which claims must and
must not be granted.93 The required bases of jurisdiction become rules of national law as
a result of the particular convention and must be available to parties from other
contracting states. Conversely, the provision containing the prohibited bases of
jurisdiction prevents the use of only these bases when the defendant is from another
contracting state. In a pure double convention, all jurisdictional bases not required are
prohibited.94 The best examples for international double conventions in this context are
the Brussels95 and the Lugano Conventions, despite differing opinions of some academics
who do not refer to them as pure double conventions.96
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Supra notes 13 and 14.
See Murphy, supra note 23 at 418.
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Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Brussels Convention illustrates its character as a double convention:
“Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State only
by virtue of the rules set out in Section 2 to 6 of this Title [II, Jurisdiction].“ Supra note 21 art. 3 (1).
Von Mehren, supra note 86 at 20 ff. These academics hold the view that the discussed conventions
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2. Mixed Conventions
A double convention in contrast to a single convention structure is only appropriate
where the countries involved have relatively common legal traditions and cultures, and
where a neutral institution97 assures that all member states act according to their
obligations.98 A mixed convention structure, on the other hand, better matches situations
where these requirements are lacking. It comes into consideration where there is neither a
sufficiently compelling sense of interdependence nor a supranational institution that
serves as a legal guard.99 Aside from the rules regarding the required and prohibited bases
of jurisdiction, a mixed convention is different from a double convention in that the
former also allows bases of jurisdiction that fall outside of the convention.100 This group
of bases of jurisdiction is often referred to as the category of permitted jurisdiction.101
The mixed convention approach was clearly favored by the United States delegation in
looking for an appropriate structure for the Preliminary Draft Convention,102 and the
Preliminary Draft Convention was created according to this structure.
Articles 3-16 of the Preliminary Draft Convention contain a list of bases in which
the courts of signatory nations will be required to take personal jurisdiction. Furthermore,

97
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it sets forth in Article 18 of the draft a list of bases which the courts of signatory nations
will be prohibited from using for the purpose of asserting personal jurisdiction. But
Article 17 sets forth a list that allows signatory states to assert personal jurisdiction on
bases that are neither prohibited nor required which makes the difference to a double
convention structure. Therefore, Contracting States are able to apply rules of jurisdiction
under their national law as long as these grounds of jurisdiction are not prohibited by the
convention. According to Article 24 of the Preliminary Draft Convention, however, other
signatory nations would not be required to recognize or enforce judgments that have been
rendered based on these national jurisdictional rules. As previously addressed, these
bases of jurisdiction are often referred to as permitted bases of jurisdiction: contracting
states may retain these “national” bases of jurisdiction, but their application and any
question of recognition and enforcement are not governed by the Convention.103

3. The Hague Convention Draft Approach
In 1992, a Working Group at The Hague Conference had recommended that the
negotiation concentrate on a draft in a mixed convention style.104 But it took some time
until the mixed convention structure was adopted and accepted as the final approach.
While there was some resistance against the mixed convention structure in earlier drafts,
which is proven by the fact that the convention was originally drafted as a double
convention,105 the October 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention as well as the later 2001
Draft were designed in the mixed convention style providing ‘permitted bases of
103
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jurisdiction.’ The attempt to answer the question of why the recommendation of a mixed
convention was finally followed, immediately leads to the issue of the large number of
potential contracting states. The double convention structure, which only provides two
categories of bases of jurisdiction is not the ideal choice in conventions seeking to be
universally acceptable. Considering the many different legal systems the convention had
to integrate into the negotiating process, it seems nearly impossible to reach an agreement
about what should be assigned to the group of the required bases of jurisdiction and what
to the group of prohibited jurisdiction. As a result, the double convention structure would
be too inflexible for the large number of different countries that are participated in the
negotiation process. The mixed convention structure seems to be the better choice in the
effort to reach agreement on the proposed Hague Convention. It provides some kind of a
“loophole” by creating a more flexible system not only in terms of the later outcome of
the convention language, but also in terms of the flexibility in the negotiation process as a
whole.

B. The Scope of the Preliminary Draft Convention
Chapter I of the Preliminary Draft Convention regulates the scope of the convention.
Whereas Article 1106 contains the rules for the substantive scope, Article 2 regulates the
territorial scope.
The language in Article 1 (1) of the Preliminary Draft Convention limits its scope
to “civil and commercial matters.”107 This very general provision is put into perspective
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by the exclusion of “revenue, customs, [and] administrative matters.”108 Article 1 (2)
explains in detail what is meant by this.109 Like the Brussels and Lugano Convention,
Article 2 of the Preliminary Draft Convention not only provides for the enforcement of
foreign judgments, but it also sets forth rules for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
the courts of one signatory country over habitual residents of another.110 However, the
jurisdictional rules in Chapter II of the Preliminary Draft Convention are not applicable if
both parties are habitually resident in the same state.111

C. Jurisdiction
1. The General Rule of Jurisdiction
Two different approaches are used in other conventions when determining general
jurisdiction. On one hand, the defendant’s domicile determines were a suit can be
brought. This approach is, for example, used in the Brussels and Lugano Convention.112
The problem with this approach is the fact that ‘domicile’ is subject to various legal
definitions in the different countries. Due to the high number of expected contracting
countries for a future Hague Convention, a more factual approach is preferred. Existing
Hague Conference conventions often faced the same problem of defining certain terms

108

Id.
According to Article 1 (1) of the Preliminary Draft Convention the excluded matters are the following:
a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons; b) maintenance obligations; c) matrimonial property
regimes and other rights and obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships; d) wills and
succession; e) insolvency, composition or analogous proceedings; f) social security; g) arbitration and
proceedings related thereto; h) admiralty or maritime matters. Id. art. 1 (1).
110
See Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 2. Article 2 reads in part: “The provisions of
Chapter II shall apply in the courts of a Contracting State unless all the parties are habitually resident in
that State [...].“
111
Id.
112
Brussels Convention, supra note 21, art. 2; Lugano Convention, supra note 30, art. 2.

109

28
and thus focus on the defendant’s habitual residence.113 Since the habitual residence
approach is much more factually oriented, it is subject to more uniform interpretation and
would be more useful for the Hague Conference project. According to this Hague
Conference tradition Article 3 (1) adopted the habitual resident approach.114 A similar
approach is applicable to legal persons. Article 3 (2) states that the rule for general
jurisdiction over legal persons is that they are considered to be habitually resident in the
state of statutory seat, the state of incorporation, the state of central management, or the
state of the corporation’s principle place of business.115

2. Choice of Court Clauses
The normal presumption in the United States regarding choice of court clauses is that
such clauses are not exclusive unless the parties specifically provide for exclusivity.116 In
contrast, E.U. Council Regulation No. 44/2001 provides that a court chosen by the parties
“shall have jurisdiction” and that this jurisdiction “shall be exclusive unless the parties
have agreed otherwise.”117 By stating that a court chosen by the parties “shall have
jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed
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otherwise,” Article 4 of the Preliminary Draft Convention118 uses nearly the same exact
wording as that contained in the Council Regulation.
Besides the issue of the choice of law clauses, Article 4 also provides language
addressing validity in terms of form. Aside from the fact that a choice of law agreement
can be in writing,119 it may also be made “by any other means of communication which
renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference,” or “in
accordance with a usage which is regularly observed by the parties,” or also

“in

accordance with a usage of which the parties were or ought to have been aware and
which is regularly observed by parties to contracts of the same nature in the particular
trade or commerce concerned.”120

3. Special Appearances
In Article 5 it becomes clear that there is an opportunity in the Preliminary Draft to enter
a special appearance contesting jurisdiction without submitting to jurisdiction on the
merits. It provides that a defendant who appears in court to defend on the merits has to
keep in mind that there is an assumption that he will be treated as if he has consented to
jurisdiction, unless objection is raised prior to the first defense on the merits.121

4. Specific Bases of Jurisdiction
Apart from the rule of jurisdiction in Article 3, which provides for general jurisdiction
over a defendant for any claims, the Preliminary Draft Convention text contains a number
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of other provisions that make it possible to provide further fora for the plaintiff in a court
that is located in a state that is not the habitual residence of the defendant. These specific
provisions include rules in contract122 and tort123 cases. Furthermore, there are specific
provisions for consumers and employees.124 The Preliminary Draft Convention also sets
forth rules for jurisdiction over claims related to the activity of the defendant through a
branch, agency or establishment in the Contracting State.125 Exclusive jurisdiction is
given to cases involving trusts.126 Article 12 provides more rules creating exclusive
jurisdiction, and it contains a provision that is of special interest in this context. Cases
involving the registration of intellectual property rights get special treatment since they
are expressly mentioned in the provision.127 In addition to these specific bases of
jurisdiction, additional jurisdictional provisions dealing with jurisdiction for personal
relief and with multiple-party actions can be found in Articles 13-16.

5. Permitted and Prohibited Bases of Jurisdiction
As discussed above, the Preliminary Draft Convention is written in a mixed convention
style since it is divided into required, prohibited and permitted bases of jurisdiction.128
The required bases of jurisdiction are contained in Articles 3-16 of the draft and were
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previously described in detail. The language of Article 17 makes the difference in
comparison to a double convention structure. It sets forth that states may exercise
jurisdiction “under national law” in the absence of exclusive jurisdiction, a choice of
forum clause under Article 4, or other bases of preferred jurisdiction when the certain
bases of jurisdiction are neither required in earlier articles nor prohibited in Article 18.129
In Article 18, another list of different bases of jurisdiction can be found. The use of these
bases of jurisdiction is prohibited when the defendant is from another contracting state. In
Article 18 (1), the Preliminary Draft Convention describes the list of the prohibited bases
of jurisdiction as follows: ”Where the defendant is habitually resident in a Contracting
State, the application of a rule of jurisdiction provided for under the national law of a
Contracting State is prohibited if there is no substantial connection between the State and
the dispute.”130 In paragraph 2 of Article 18, the draft provides a list of examples in
which such a substantial connection between the particular state and the dispute cannot
be assumed: the domicile, habitual or temporary residence, or presence of the plaintiff in
the specific state,131 or the nationality of the plaintiff or of the defendant.132
With Article 18 (2)(e) and (2)(f), two other examples should receive special
consideration since these provisions are of particular interest for the United States. Most
state long – arm statutes and also the Due Process clause of the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States commonly allow general “doing
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business” jurisdiction.133 Article 18 (2)(e) was created to forbid exactly this general
“doing business” jurisdiction by stating that jurisdiction based on “the carrying on of
commercial or other activities by the defendant in [the] state” shall be prohibited.134 An
exception is made for situations “where the dispute is directly related to those
activities.”135 Article 18 (2)(f),136 on the other hand, was set forth to prohibit another
jurisdictional institution that is also typical of the United States legal system. It prohibits
the United States’ “tag” jurisdiction. This kind of jurisdiction is purely based on the
service of process on the defendant while temporarily present in the state.137 Article 18
(2) lists further examples that will not be described in detail here.138
Article 18 (3) deals with the exceptions to the general rules contained in the first
two paragraphs and is indicated in bracketed language. It is intended that if the case is
brought for human rights violations under international law, any of the normally
prohibited bases of jurisdiction are continued to be allowed as permitted bases of
jurisdiction.139 The pressure of concerned groups and individuals that formed the Human
Rights Coalition with the intention to participate in the negotiations led to the inclusion of
this provision in Article 18.140 The reason for including this provision was the fear of the
Human Rights Coalition that a new convention without an exception would frustrate
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developing methods for bringing suits against former state officials who have engaged in
wrongful conduct.141 Special consideration in this context was given to cases that were,
or are brought under the United States “tag” jurisdiction.142

6. Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens
Article 21 and 22 of the Preliminary Draft Convention determine what happens when
more than one jurisdiction is available in cases connected to more than one legal system
and more than one court was seized of the case. To understand these provisions, their
background in the different legal systems involved in the negotiation process shall be
described first.
Having its first roots in the year 1801 in Willendson v. Forsoket,143 the concept of
forum non conveniens in the United States is described as a doctrine that gives the court
substantial discretion when more than one forum is available for the trail of an action.144
However, this doctrine presupposes at least one alternative forum in which the suit can be
prosecuted.145 It does not, however, provide a catalogue of circumstances that would lead
to the assumption that the court either has or does not have jurisdiction.146 Rather, the
doctrine trusts in the discretion of the court147 as mentioned above. Thus, this concept
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places the focus on the appropriateness of one forum in comparison to others that would
be available as well.148
The forum non conveniens approach, which is typical in common law countries,
has no direct equivalent in the civil law system. For example, there is no express
provision of German law that would allow for a forum non convenience doctrine.149
However, there is a counterpart that comes into play in civil law countries in situations
where the forum non conveniens doctrine applies in the common law systems. Although
the Lugano150 and Brussels Convention151 and the Brussels Regulation152 replacing the
latter do not contain any direct provision for the doctrine of forum non conveniens,153 the
Regulation does apply a combination of contractual choice of court clauses154 and a strict
rule of lis pendens155 in order to establish jurisdiction. Although this creates certainty,
predictability, and neutrality it has to be pointed out that the European approach creates
what is usually refer to as a “race to the courthouse.”156
Considering the differences between the common law forum non conveniens and
the civil law lis pendens approach, it seems surprising that this matter was precisely one
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of the areas of early agreement and compromise in the negotiations of the Hague
Convention. The Preliminary Draft Convention sets forth a combination of the lis
pendens rule in Article 21 and a modified forum non conveniens approach in Article
22157 which is insofar unusual as the latter was always considered to be only available in
common law systems.158 Article 21, which adopts the Brussels Convention-style lis
pendens approach, provides that “the court second seized shall suspend the proceedings if
the court first seized has jurisdiction”159 and that this court “shall decline jurisdiction as
soon as it is presented with a judgment rendered by the court first seized.”160 However,
the court second seized does not have to suspend the proceedings if it has exclusive
jurisdiction either under Article 4 (choice of court) or under Article 12 (verification of
jurisdiction).161 Thus, as indicated above, the approach in the Brussels Regulation is the
first element of the compromise. By stating that the lis pendens rule shall not apply if the
court first seized “determines that the court second seized is clearly more appropriate to
resolve the dispute” Article 21, paragraph 7, ties the language in Article 21 to Article 22
of the Preliminary Convention text according to which such a determination is
possible.162
Article 22 represents the second part of the compromise, since it incorporates a
modification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as applied in the common law
system.163 The forum non conveniens rule of the Preliminary Draft Convention provides
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four requirements. Firstly, the court must not have exclusive jurisdiction. Secondly,
“exceptional circumstances” must be involved in the case and the court that was seized
must be a forum that is considered to be “clearly inappropriate.” The last of the four
requirements is that “a clearly more appropriate” forum must be provided by another
state also having jurisdiction. To give the court an idea of what can be an appropriate
forum, Article 22 (2) sets forth four factors that are not exclusive, though.164

D. Recognition and Enforcement
Chapter III of the Preliminary Draft Convention (Articles 23 to 36) deals with the matter
of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Within this chapter, the distinction
between required, prohibited, and permitted bases of jurisdiction must be taken into
account again. The principles regarding the recognition and enforcement of judgments
completes the idea of a mixed convention style. The general concept of this chapter is
that the judgments based on required bases of jurisdiction “shall be recognized or
enforced.”165 However, not recognized or enforced are those judgments that are based on
prohibited bases of jurisdiction under Article 18.166 The same is true for judgments that
are based on grounds of jurisdiction conflicting with either a choice of court clause or
exclusive bases of jurisdiction, as provided by the Preliminary Draft Convention.167 As
far as permitted bases of jurisdiction are concerned, the convention rules on recognition
on application by a party, suspend its proceedings if in that case it is clearly inappropriate for that court
to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of another state has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to
resolve the dispute.“ Id. art. 22 (1).
164
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and enforcement of judgments shall not apply.168 Instead, these judgments are to be
treated under national law.169
Article 33 makes clear that the recognition may include a limitation on damages
in the recognizing court. This limitation regards the concerns that were raised among
others by the European members of the Hague Conference about punitive damage awards
and compensatory awards rendered in U.S. courts that are considered “excessive” in the
eyes of European judicial systems, for example.170 According to Article 33, courts do not
have to recognize and enforce punitive and multiple damage awards unless ”similar or
comparable damages could have been awarded” in their own state.171 As far as
“excessive” compensatory damage awards are concerned Article 33 (2) states that if
“grossly excessive damages” are awarded in a judgment the recognition may be limited
to less than the full amount.172

E. Other General Provisions
It is not a secret that the European Union with its many institutions is a good place if one
is an interpreter looking for employment. The interpretation of the legal language of the
instruments issued by the European Union is one of the major problems its member states
have to face. Therefore, it is not very difficult to imagine that a future Hague Convention
would have to face similar if not bigger problems, since there are considerably more
members in the Hague Conference than there are in the European Union. Another
problem would be the cultural, legal, and social diversity among the several member
168
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states that could obstruct the interpretation process and bear the risk of conflicting
interpretations. Article 38 of the Preliminary Convention text tries to resolve this problem
by advising the courts to interpret the convention with “regard [...] to [...] its international
character and the need to promote uniformity in its application.” Articles 39 and 40173 try
to constitute a system which has three major goals. Firstly, significant convention
decisions from all contracting states would be collected. Besides this, a periodic review
of the operation of the convention by a Special Commission was planned. If there were to
be problems in a dispute that is attributed to the interpretation of the convention, a
committee of experts was intended to assist parties and courts that have problems by
providing those with recommendations.174
Aside from the heading in Article 41, “Federal Clause,” no further substantial
language indicates that the drafters of the Preliminary Draft Convention intended to
include provisions on how the convention would operate within a federal system.175
Furthermore, up to this point in the negotiations there was also no complete provision on
the relationship of the Hague Convention to other treaties.176
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CHAPTER 4
DEVELOPMENTS IN AND AFTER THE JUNE 2001 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE

Between February 2000 and June 2001, informal sessions for the Hague project
were held in Washington, Basle, Geneva, Ottawa, and Edinburgh in order to improve the
Preliminary Draft Convention.177 The June 2001 Diplomatic Conference was another
milestone in the negotiation process because the Preliminary Draft was further developed.
The result of the first part of the Diplomatic Conference in June 2001 was a text full of
alternatives, variations, and bracketed language.178 These circumstances indicated that
there was no agreement on many specific matters and that much work was left to be
done.

A. Changes in the Convention Text
It is important to point out which changes in comparison with the Preliminary Draft
Convention were made in detail in the Interim Text. While no changes were made to the
convention structure,179 the scope of the convention was subject to a few changes.
Antitrust claims and nuclear liability matters were added to Article 1 Interim Text.180 The
fact that these two points were added in brackets indicates that a final agreement on this
177
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issue has not yet been made. This is also true for Alternative B of Article 1, which
suggests the exclusion of rights in immovable property and claims related to the validity,
nullity, or dissolution of a legal person.181 The entire Interim Text is full of bracketed
language and footnotes trying to bring light into the darkness of the jungle of alternatives.
Regarding the issue of jurisdiction in Article 3, there was an agreement that the
defendant’s forum should serve as the forum of general jurisdiction.182 But another
change was made: The “habitual residence” requirement was set in brackets left behind
only “residence.” This change was due to the problem that natural persons can have
multiple residences.183 In case of a multiple residence situation the focus was to be on the
principle of residence.184 No major changes were undertaken in the rule for choice of
forum clauses, but bracketed language again indicates the need for further discussions on
this issue.185
As far as special appearance under the convention regulated in Article 5 is
concerned the text has both changed and remained unchanged. While the presumption
that a defendant appearing on the merits has consented to jurisdiction under the
convention had been deleted, the general concept of special appearance was retained.186
The defendant, furthermore, had the right to contest jurisdiction until the time of the first
actual defense on the merits.187
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While the general jurisdiction rule was left nearly unchanged, the discussions
about the specific bases of jurisdiction were more controversial. In the informal meetings
and the Diplomatic Conference, much time was spent on Articles 6 and 10, which assess
contract and tort respectively.188 Hardly discussed was Article 12 which deals with the
rules of exclusive jurisdiction.189 The majority of discussions were focused on the
provisions that have an impact on electronic commerce and intellectual property rights.
The gap between the negotiating parties in these matters was so significant that the two
issues were given their own chapters.190 The changes on these parts of the convention
will be discussed later.
The additional bases of jurisdiction were subject to changes as well. Article 14 of
the Preliminary Draft Convention would have authorized jurisdiction over multiple
defendants in cases where jurisdiction existed over only one of them.191 This Article was
deleted in the Interim Text.192 The same happened to Article 16 of the Preliminary Draft
Convention,193 which contained a similar rule for third party claims.194
Similar controversial discussions were held on the matter of the permitted and
prohibited bases of jurisdiction. The especially difficult question remained as to what to
include in the list of the prohibited bases of jurisdiction. The problem was to find a
healthy balance between the matters on this list and the inclusion of related matters on the
list that represents the required bases of jurisdiction.195 This explains why Article 18 of
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the Interim Text remained largely in brackets196 indicating that further discussion was
necessary.
As addressed earlier, the wording in Articles 21 and 22 was an area of early
compromise although no one would have expected that, considering the differences
between the lis pendence and the forum non conveniens approach.197 Thus, these
provisions remained relatively unchanged even after the 2001 Diplomatic Conference.198
The provisions dealing with the problems on recognition and enforcement of judgments
remained unchanged for the most part.199 That indicated consensus between the
negotiating parties in this context as well.

B. Developments and Different Perspectives
1. Beginning Anew
After the June 2001 Diplomatic Conference the negotiations had come to a standstill
since it had ended in disagreement, as demonstrated by the bracketed Interim Text. After
reaching this impasse, the negotiations were suspended until a three day meeting from
April 22 to 24 of the Hague Conference’s Commission I on General Affairs and Policy of
the Nineteenth Diplomatic Session of the Hague Conference in The Hague. Officials
from different delegations met to discuss whether there was a chance for the Hague

196

Interim Text, supra note 178, art. 18.
See supra part III.C.6.
198
Compare Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, art. 21, 22, with Interim Text, supra note 178,
art. 21, 22.
199
Compare Preliminary Draft Convention, supra note 61, Chapter III, with Interim Text, supra note 178,
Chapter III.

197

43
Convention project to be continued, and if so, how it would continue.200 Already before
the meeting in April problems with the further negotiations became apparent: The United
States was in favor of moving forward in negotiating the provisions that are subject to
little controversy. This implied the dropping of the controversial issues and the wish to
develop a narrower treaty.201 Other states like Australia, Japan, Canada, and also the
European Union proposed a return to the Preliminary Draft Convention and therefore
favored comprehensive treaty negotiations.202 At the meeting itself it turned out
immediately that there was a common will to continue with the negotiations. It was
agreed to set up a new drafting committee with the intention to begin the drafting process
anew, avoiding and dropping the most controversial matters and concentrating on the
relatively non-controversial issues.203 This outcome and especially the creation of an
informal working group on the judgments project, however, was not expected by
everyone after the Australian and the Japanese delegation released a letter that proposed
the basis for the negotiations to be the 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention.204 The
problem with this suggestion was that the alternative to go back to the Preliminary Draft
level had long ago been deemed as unworkable by U.S. official and business interests.205
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However, a new working group was created to negotiate a new draft. This
working group, containing less than 20 members, was smaller than past negotiating
groups.206 With the small size of the group it was intended to make the agreement process
more effective, to let aside political influences, and to concentrate technical skills.207 The
working group planned to meet two or three times in 2002 and aimed to come up with a
new draft for the Convention in early 2003.208 The official conclusion of the treaty was
projected for a final Diplomatic Conference dealing with the judgment and enforcement
topic before the end of 2003,209 even though there were many doubts that the negotiation
process would move quickly enough to hold a Diplomatic Conference at the scheduled
time.210 However, the head of the coordinating body for the negotiations was convinced
that a limited treaty could emerge in late 2003.211 The standpoint of the Hague
Conference after the April 2002 meeting is well demonstrated by a statement of Hans
Vaan Loon, then secretary general of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
who stated that too much pressure to expand the scope of the Hague Convention during
the negotiations would make the project ultimately fail.212
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It was decided to take “the core area and possible additions” as a basis for further
negotiations.213 Keeping this in mind two stages of negotiations were designed. The goal
of the first stage, as mentioned above, was to concentrate on the core of the convention
and, therefore, to negotiate on more or less non-controversial subjects like choice of
court, jurisdiction in the domicile of the defendant, jurisdiction with respect to branches
of companies, appearance, physical torts, trusts, and counterclaims.214 The second stage
was designed to discuss whether and how more controversial matters could be included
after consensus was reached on the basic provisions discussed in the first stage.
Therefore, it was intended to broaden the convention at a later point in time.215 The most
important issues in this context involve jurisdiction to hear e-commerce and other internet
related disputes as well as disputes involving intellectual property rights.216 Nonetheless
topics like jurisdiction based on activity, consumer and employment contracts, the
relationship of the proposed Hague Convention to regional regulations on jurisdiction,
and bilateralisation were on the list of topics that seemed to bar the negotiation
process.217

2. First Meeting on the Judgment Project
The first meeting of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project, which was
held in The Hague from October 22 to 25, 2002, was prepared by a paper that
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summarized and outlined the major issues that had to be discussed leading to a treaty
with a limited scope.218 This paper was issued by First Secretary Andrea Schulz, a
member of the Hague Conference staff heading up the working group.219 The main
concern of this paper was to address the question of whether it would be reasonable to
limit a later Hague Convention to choice of court clauses in business-to-business cases.220
This was a concern because the choice of court agreements in business-to-business cases
were identified as one of the “core areas” besides the provisions on recognition and
enforcement in both the Preliminary Draft Convention and the Interim Text.221
Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that contracts between businesses typically specify
which country’s court system will be used if a dispute arises over the transaction, hence
such clauses merit special consideration.
During the meeting, the members of the new working group focused almost
entirely on exclusive choice of court clauses in business-to-business cases. The
discussion in this context concentrated on possible convention requirements on formal
and substantive validity of such choice of court clauses, the possible scope of a rule on
choice of court clauses, the issues in the relationship with other conventions,
bilateralisation, and the applicability or non-applicability of national and or convention
rules on lis pendens and forum non conveniens. It also focused on the problem of
personal versus subject matter jurisdiction and the question of interim relief.222
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Another matter discussed was a possible exclusion of patents and trademarks,
both registered and unregistered, which would leave only copyrights covered by the
scope of the treaty.223 The outcome of the discussion was the decision to seek feedback in
the different countries about this plan.224 The next meeting was planned to take place in
early January 2003, and two others were to follow in March and May 2003.

3. Second Meeting on the Judgment Project
The Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project gathered a second time in The
Hague from January 6 to 9, 2003.225 At this meeting, the discussion from the first meeting
on the Judgment Project were continued, and questions that had remained open were
revisited. The meeting mainly focused on the exclusive choice of court clauses,
specifically concentrating on the definition of “exclusive” to determine where to draw the
line between exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court clauses.226 Other issues
discussed during the meeting were linked to the limitation of the scope of the treaty. The
group primarily discussed whether a case involving a choice of court clause should be
required to have some international element in order to be covered by the scope of the
convention.227 Other topics discussed included whether some kind of objective link with
the chosen forum was necessary,228 and whether there should be a general escape clause
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including a public policy provision.229 There were also further discussions regarding
intellectual property issues.230 Moreover, the group addressed whether it would still be
possible to add further bases of jurisdiction to the reduced convention scope and which
bases should be considered.231 In this context consent / waiver / submission, counterclaims, and defendant’s forum were taken into consideration.232

a. A New Draft
The discussions were interesting generally. The most interesting issue at the second
meeting, however, was due to the consequence of a requirement places on the group in
this meeting by the Commission on General Affairs in April 2002. The meeting was
obliged to come up with a first draft of a possible convention based on the result of the
discussions that had thus far taken place.
The informal working group fulfilled this obligation by issuing first draft
language. The member states of the Hague Conference as well as other interested parties
were provided not only with some new draft language but with a completely new draft.
More than 10 years after the birth of the project of the Hague Conference a new draft
appeared that was to decide whether the undertaking would have a promising future or
whether it would be forgotten after little more than a decade. The new draft was issued in
the annex of the official report of the second meeting of the informal working group.233
The word draft can be understood literally since the issued language only included what
the parties had agreed upon up to that point.
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b. Content of the New Draft
Chapter I of the new draft dealt with the scope of a possible new convention. Article 1
(substantive scope) provided that the convention applies to “agreements on the Choice of
Court concluded in civil or commercial matters.”234 However, the absence of text under
sub-section b and sub-section c indicated that this is not the final word on this issue. The
provision also included language that gave an idea on what the convention would not
apply to. Consumer contracts235 as well as individual contracts of employment236 were
expressly excluded from the scope of the convention. Chapter II of the new approach
included the jurisdictional rules, which provided a court of a contracting state with
jurisdiction when that had been agreed upon in a choice of court agreement between the
parties.237 Chapter III was intended to regulate recognition and enforcement issues.
However, the informal working group had not prepared language for this part of a new
approach. Chapter IV was reserved for final clauses covering issues like the limitation of
jurisdiction and the relationship to other international instruments.

234

Id. art. 1 (1) lit. a. Article 3 provides a definition on the choice of court agreement issue. According to
Art. 3 (1) a choice of court agreement “is an agreement whereby two or more parties designate, for the
purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise between them in connection with a
particular legal relationship, the courts of one country or one specific court to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of any other courts[ or the courts of a certain number of countries or certain specific courts
to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts].” Art. 3 (2) furthermore provides that ”an
agreement whereby parties have designated a court to decide disputes between them as provided in
paragraph 1shall be deemed to exclude the jurisdiction of any other courts unless the parties have
otherwise agreed.”
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Id. art. 1 (2) lit. a. The working group issued the draft with a concrete definition of consumer contracts.
According to Art. 1 (2) lit. a “a consumer contract is an agreement between a natural person acting
preliminary for personal, family or household purposes (the consumer) and another party acting for the
purpose of its trade or profession, or between two consumers.”
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c. Comments
Even though the outcome of the second meeting was not more than a fraction of a draft
this fraction marked a turning point in the development of the entire Hague Convention
project. The scope of the convention was reduced to choice of court agreements in
business-to-business relationships. Consumer contracts were expressly excluded. These
key features determined all the subsequent negotiations.

4. Third Meeting on the Judgments Project
The next meeting was held from 25 to 28 March in 2003 in The Hague, which was
immediately before the meeting of Commission I on General Affairs and Policy of the
Hague Conference from 1 to 3 April 2003. The main purpose of setting up a working
group was to prepare a text on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in civil and commercial matters. This text was to be submitted to a Special
Commission during the first half of 2003 followed by a Diplomatic Conference to be
held, if possible, at the end of 2003. The third meeting on the judgments project fulfilled
the first part of the requirements set forth in 2002 by issuing a nearly complete draft, the
Preliminary Result of the Working Group (Preliminary Result).238 The document issued
includes draft language that continues the work done in the previous two meetings.
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a. The Preliminary Result of the Working Group
Chapter I dealing with the scope of the convention does not contain modifications
compared to the draft issued after the second meeting of the working group. However,
besides the exclusions already mentioned above further language excluding several
matters was included. For example, Article 1 (3) Preliminary Result states that the
convention shall not apply to proceedings related to the status and legal capacity of
natural persons and maintenance obligations. The list provided in this part of the draft
basically equals the list that was included in Article 1 of the Preliminary Draft
Convention.239 One important change, however, must be pointed out. The Preliminary
Result sets forth that the convention shall not apply to proceedings related to the “validity
of patents, trademarks and [other intellectual property rights – to be defined].”240 Article
2 of the Preliminary Result provides definitions that clarify the language of the
convention, and Article 3 of the Preliminary Result241 sets forth the requirements for the
formal validity.242
No changes were made to the draft that was issued after the second meeting of the
working group with respect to the general jurisdictional rule. Thus, the rule continued to
be that the court chosen in the agreement to settle all the disputes in the legal relationship
between the parties had jurisdiction.243 However, that provision did not apply when all
the parties involved are habitually resident in the state where the chosen court is
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situated.244 That part of Article 4 provided that an international element is required in
order to make the convention applicable. In other words, the convention would not be
applicable in what are considered to be domestic cases.
That the chosen court enjoys priority status is shown in Article 5, which states that
courts in a contracting state other than the chosen court “shall decline jurisdiction or
suspend proceedings.”245 Exceptions to this rule are first made in cases where the
agreement is void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed in the eyes of the court
that was not chosen, and second if the chosen court declines jurisdiction.246 A third
exception again addresses the problem regarding the international element by stating that
a court in a contracting state does not have to decline jurisdiction if all elements except
the choice of court agreements itself are connected only to that contracting state.247
While the draft issued after the second meeting of the informal working group
lacked language regarding recognition and enforcement, the Preliminary Result draft
provided new provisions in this field. The general rule of Article 7 provides that the
judgment of the court that was chosen must be recognized and enforced in other
contracting states unless the catalogue of exceptions that make a refusal of the
recognition and enforcement possible applies.248 Procedural rules in Articles 8 – 10 and
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language regarding the award of non-compensatory damages,249 which is similar to the
approach in the Preliminary Draft Convention,250 as well as provisions that regard
severability and the recognition and enforcement of settlements to which the chosen court
has given its authority251 complete Chapter III.
Chapter IV of the draft contains general provisions regarding limitation of
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement as well as provisions that shall provide a
uniform interpretation of the convention.252 Among other matters, Chapter V deals with
the problem of signature, ratification and entry into force.253

b. Comments
The draft text on choice of court agreements issued after the third meeting of the Informal
Working Group on the Judgments Project is the outcome of the new focus of the
negotiations. While the language issued in former texts applied the convention to civil
and commercial matters in general, the new approach narrowed this field of application
drastically, covering only a small portion of what was originally planned to be covered. It
remains to be seen whether this approach can make the entire project succeed and
whether there is a chance of adding second stage issues.

procedure of the State addressed;] or e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible
with the public policy of the State addressed. 2. In addition, recognition or enforcement of a judgment
given by a court of a Contracting State designated in a choice of court agreement other than an
exclusive choice of court agreement may be refused if - a) proceedings between the same parties and
having the same subject matter are pending before a court that was seized prior to the court of origin,
either in the State addressed or in another State, provided that in the latter case the court is expected to
render a judgment capable of being recognized or enforced in the State addressed; or b) the judgment is
inconsistent with a judgment rendered, either in the State addressed or in another State, provided that in
the latter case the judgment is capable of being recognized or enforced in the State addressed.“
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5. Special Commission Meeting in December 2003
a. The Road to the Meeting
Although of a very limited scope, the new draft brought an unforeseen level of agreement
between the parties. At the meeting of the Commission I on General Affairs and Policy of
the Hague Conference that met from 1 to 3 April 2003 it was decided that the negotiation
parties should review the draft.254 The different governments were asked to deliver their
official views and opinions to the Hague Conference by July 2003. The main question to
be answered was whether the new draft could be the basis for the further negotiations on
the convention. It was intended to have intense negotiations in December 2003 if the
response to the new draft was positive.255
The new draft was discussed in industry as well as in consumer groups. Business
groups expressed their general agreement with the draft. Much of the software industry’s
sales, for example, are business-to-business transaction in an international setting.
Therefore, the new draft would be, in the eyes of the business environment, a perfect tool
to provide more predictability in jurisdiction and enforcement of judgement in this
field.256 Consumer groups, on the other hand, raised concerns that the new approach
could be an inflexible framework that is difficult to change.257 This is especially
important keeping in mind that there are many second stage issues left to be addressed.
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Another concern, already stressed above, was that firms could “forum shop” and force
weaker parties to accept their provisions.
After Hans Van Loon, the secretary general of the Hague Conference, reviewed
the opinions of the draft that were sent in by almost 30 countries, he concluded that the
parties wanted to move forward with the negotiations based on the limited version of the
convention. Although further clarification and improvement was suggested, “all replies
concur in the view that the draft text should be put forward as the basis for the work.”258
Therefore, the road was clear for a Special Commission to discuss the topic at a meeting
in The Hague, Netherlands from 1 to 9 December 2003.

b. The December 2003 Draft
There were two main messages the Special Commission meeting delivered. First, there
was the confirmation by all the members of the negotiations that there would be a
convention on choice of court and enforcement of judgments. This is especially important
because many negotiators doubted that all the discussions would lead to a result in the
end. After the December 2003 meeting the Hague Convention seemed to have become a
shared project. The second outcome is of substantive nature to emphasize this intention of
new negotiations. A complete draft, the December 2003 Draft on Exclusive Choice of
Court Agreements was proposed.259 Although nearly identical with the Preliminary
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Result, this time official conventional language was distributed to the general public by
the drafting committee and not only by the working group. It demonstrates and manifests
the will of the negotiating parties to move forward as they had decided months before.
Like the Preliminary Result, the proposal by the drafting committee was limited to
enforcing choice of court clauses within business-to-business contracts which identified
which court would have exclusive jurisdiction if a dispute arises. Therefore, clauses that
would give jurisdiction to more than one court would not be recognized by the draft. The
draft would also enforce judgments made by those courts. However, there are some
differences between the two latest drafts. Article 1 (4) sets forth that the proceedings
which were excluded from the scope of the convention in Article 1 (3) remain covered by
the convention if one of the matters referred to in this Article arises merely as an
incidental question. That will especially become important in connection with claims
involving intellectual property. Another point of discussion is that the European Union
had favored language that would allow the Brussels Regulation to override the Hague
Convention. Therefore, if an Italian business sues a German company under a contract
containing a choice of court clause which makes a French court the chosen court, the
Brussels Regulation and not a later Hague Convention would be applicable according to
the will of the European Union. This could also be a major problem in finding later
agreement on a final convention since there are situations that raise doubts on whether
such a provision is workable. The following example is only one of these situations: a
U.S. company that has a Finish branch office enters into a contract with an Austrian
company containing a choice of court clause selecting U.S. courts. Would the European
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Union be able to claim that, because the Finish office is essentially involved in the
contract, the case has to be heard in an EU court instead of an U.S. court even though the
choice of court clause provides for the latter? This example demonstrates the potential for
controversy that the European Union proposal causes.
Changes were also made in Article 3 of the new draft. E-commerce companies
and internet service providers complained about Article 3 of the Preliminary Result draft.
Language in the draft could make it possible to subject not only traditional internet
providers but also libraries and universities, which transmit and store lots of digital
information for third parties, to extensive liability in foreign courts under choice of court
agreements they have never seen nor assented to. The language about usage that the
parties “knew or ought to have known” in Article 3 (d) of the Preliminary Result draft
was replaced by requirements for an exclusive choice of court agreement. Such an
agreement must be entered into or evidenced either in writing or “by any other means of
communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent
reference.”260 Internet providers in the U.S. have pointed out that the phrase “any other
means” remains unacceptable for them.261
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C. Comments
The December 2003 Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements was accompanied
by a draft report in March 2004.262 This report was drawn up for the attention of the
Special Commission meeting in April 2004. It was by far the most detailed report to a
draft that was ever released by the Hague Conference. It is a symbol for the confidence of
the Conference and the negotiating parties that a future Convention is in sight. The report
gives a detailed explanation to each Article of the draft that was released in December
2003.
The introduction to the report summarizes the changes that have been made with
respect to the judgments project since the parties had decided to start over in their efforts
to negotiate a future Hague Convention. It has become clear that the scope of the
judgments project has changed from a convention that includes a wide range of rules on
jurisdiction, enforcement, and recognition to a convention which has a far more modest
objective. According to the draft report, the objective of the convention is “to make
exclusive choice of court agreements as effective as possible in the context of
international business.”263 The report expresses the hope that a future Hague Convention
will have the same impact on choice of court agreements as the New York Convention of
1958264 has had on arbitration agreements.265
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In order to achieve this goal, three obligations are identified266 that have been
pillars of the new approaches since the negotiators decided to start over in their effort to
draft a convention. (1) The courts of the member states are obliged to hear the dispute.
The key provision for this obligation is Article 4 of the December 2003 Draft on
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements. It sets forth that the chosen court has jurisdiction
and must exercise it. (2) All other courts must decline jurisdiction. While Article 4 of the
December 2003 Draft is addressed to the chosen court, Article 5 of the December 2003
Draft is addressed to all other courts. Those must suspend or dismiss the proceedings
before them if they concern the same claim. (3) The judgments rendered by the court
must be recognized and enforced by the courts in other countries. Article 7 of the
December 2003 Draft addresses the courts in which recognition for the judgment that was
given by the chosen member state court is sought. Those courts must recognize and
enforce the judgments that were given by the member state court that was designated in
an exclusive choice of court agreement.
This framework makes clear what is left from the original project of a mixed
convention. The present draft provides for only exclusive choice of court agreements.
Therefore, it covers only one of the original jurisdictional grounds that were included in
the so called “white list” of the early drafts which contained the required bases of
jurisdiction. A court is only required to exercise jurisdiction if it is selected in a choice of
court agreement and other courts are only required to recognize and enforce judgments
that were rendered by these courts. This fact demonstrates again that the scope of the new
draft is very narrow. In contrast with the mixed convention, there is no “black list” with
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prohibited bases of jurisdiction. Due to the fact that only the chosen member state court
can exercise jurisdiction, however, all other courts are prohibited from deciding a case
that is covered by the agreement.267 Therefore, the member state courts must refrain from
exercising jurisdiction only in case the parties made an exclusive choice of a court to
resolve disputes under the contract.
Since the required and the prohibited bases of jurisdiction were reduced to one
base of jurisdiction each, the list of permitted bases of jurisdiction under the old draft, the
so called “grey list,” is very wide. It includes all cases that are not covered by an
exclusive choice of court agreement.268 In these cases, the courts in the Contracting Sates
can choose whether they wish to exercise jurisdiction. If they do, the courts in the other
member states are free to enforce and recognize the rendered judgments. This even
applies to some cases with exclusive choice of court agreements since consumer contracts
and employment contracts are not included in the scope of the December 2003 Draft on
Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements.
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CHAPTER 5
PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 2005 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE

The Convention project received expedited status in 2005 and therefore enjoys priority
among the Hague Conference projects.269 Whether the year 2005 is going to be “The
Year of the Hague Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” will probably
be decided by the outcome of the June 2005 Diplomatic Conference. It was scheduled for
June 14 to 30, 2005.270

A. The April 2004 Special Commission Meeting
During a Special Commission meeting on the judgment project from 21 to 27 April 2004,
the Hague Conference reconsidered the December 2003 Draft Convention on Exclusive
Choice of Court Agreements and the March 2004 Draft Report that had been drawn up
for the attention of this Special Commission. The various delegations tried to improve the
draft and dealt with the remaining issues. The outcome of this meeting was the April
2004 Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements,271 which was issued in May 2004.
Much of the draft is identical with that of December 2003. It does include some important
changes and additions. Like most of the drafts issued by the Hague Conference in the
269
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past, the April 2004 Draft also included a text with some alternatives. However, it is
important to point out that there was far less bracketed language in this draft than in past
drafts. The draft consisted of thirty one Articles which are analyzed by the December
2004 Draft Report.272 The Diplomatic Conference in June 2005 will discuss the April
2004 Draft in light of the December 2004 Draft Report. The report will itself be the main
basis for all of the discussions at the Conference. While the April 2004 Draft is fourteen
pages long, the accompanying report is sixty pages long and is extremely detailed. It
reads like a detailed commentary to the draft. The December 2004 Draft Report is an
edited and improved version of the March 2004 Draft Report, which is why both reports
are very similar. Reading the report seems to leave no doubt that the negotiating parties
are serious about adopting a final convention in June 2005. However, hundreds of
footnotes demonstrate that there was and is going to be much discussion in detailed areas
between the negotiating parties and that there are still areas of disagreement.

B. The April 2004 Draft Convention on the Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements
1. Scope
The scope of the convention is framed by three limitations. According to Article 1 of the
April 2004 Draft, the convention is only applicable in international cases that include a
choice of court agreement regarding a civil or commercial matter.273 This positive
definition of the convention scope is accompanied by a negative one in Article 2 of the
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April 2004 Draft which excludes consumer and employment contracts from the scope of
the convention.274
Article 1275 gives two definitions for what is regarded as an international case.
While Article 1 (2) defines “international” for the purpose of the rules on jurisdiction in
Chapter II of the draft, Article 1 (3) gives a definition regarding the rules on recognition
and enforcement in Chapter III. A case is regarded international in the first context if at
least one of the involved parties is not a resident in the state of the court seized, or if
another element that is in some kind related to the dispute276 has a connection to another
state. That means a case is international with regard to jurisdiction unless the parties are
both resident in the Contracting State of the court seized and the relationship of the
parties and all other relevant elements are connected only with this particular state.277 In
determining whether the requirements for an application of the convention are met, the
perspective of the seized court is decisive. If two parties resident in Sweden enter into a
contract with an exclusive choice of court agreement that provides a French court with
exclusive jurisdiction over the case which regards a civil matter and one of the parties
sues in a Swedish court, this court does not have to apply the convention since both
parties are resident in the Contracting state of the court seized.278 However, if a party sues
in France the French court will determine whether the convention is applicable. From the
French court’s perspective the case would be international since none of the parties is
resident in France. Therefore, the French court would be required by Article 5 of the
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April 2004 draft to hear the case. The December 2004 Draft Report remarks that such a
setting could lead to a judgment that is inconsistent with the situation in which two
parties that are resident in the same state would expect from a court in that state.279 The
report draws into doubt whether this is the result that the negotiating states intended.
These apprehensions are hard to understand, however, since contracting parties will
usually have a specific reason for choosing a court in another state. The choice of a
“neutral” court without researching the consequences of this choice seems especially
unlikely considering that the convention is applicable in the business-to-business
relationship only. In such a relationship the typical “take it or leave it” contract that is
often found in a business-to-consumer setting is less likely to occur. However, it is not
said that such settings would never occur. In the world of e-commerce, a small family
business doing business with a big corporation over the internet could easily be in a
position similar to that of a consumer.
Article 1 (3) sets forth that a case is regarded international for purposes of Chapter
III (recognition and enforcement) if the judgment that is sought to be recognized and
enforced is foreign. This definition makes it possible that even cases which were not
considered international under the Article 1 (2) definition can be considered international
under this definition. If the Swedish parties in the example above choose a court in
Sweden in their agreement, according to Article 1 (2) the case is not considered
international. However, if one of the parties tries to enforce the Swedish judgment in the
Netherlands, the case would become international for the Dutch court, for example. The
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Dutch court would have to enforce and recognize the judgment given the case that none
of the exceptions in Article 9 apply.
Article 1 also requires that a case including an exclusive choice of court
agreement concerns a civil or commercial matter. The latter is a standard in many
international conventions. The limitation to civil and commercial matters necessarily
excludes criminal and public law matters from the convention’s scope.280 The reasons for
choosing an exclusive choice of court agreement instead of a non-exclusive one become
clear in the following example. Assuming one of the Swedish parties in the original
example above (French court was chosen in the agreement) sue in an Italian court. For
the Italian court, the case is international since none of the parties is resident in Italy. If
Article 1 would not require an exclusive choice of court agreement, then the Italian court
would be entitled to hear the case even if the case was brought to a French court later.
The December 2004 Draft Report states that a non-exclusive choice of court agreement
would raise issues of lis pendens that would be difficult to resolve.281 It was pointed out
above, however, that this matter was an area of early agreement in the first draft ever
issued on the matter.282 Therefore, the report should not use the lis pendens issue as a
reason for narrowing the scope of the convention. The convention as it stands right now
could not work with non exclusive choice of court agreements. Article 5 and Article 7
would not make sense in such a case.
Article 3 sets forth a detailed definition of what is considered an “exclusive
choice of court agreement.” There are five requirements to the definition: (1) agreement
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between the parties, (2) proper form, (3) exclusivity, (4) reciprocity, and (5) the
designation must be “for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise
in connection with a particular legal relationship.”
Whether there is an agreement between the parties is determined by the law of the
State of the chosen court. No express language is provided, which shows that such an
approach is favored to an approach applying autonomous rules like those laid down by
the European Court of Justice for the Brussels Convention.283 However, references in
other Articles of the April 2004 Draft to the application of State law strongly suggest
such a result.284 The requirements for a proper form of an exclusive choice of court
agreement are laid down in Article 3 (c). In the words of Article 3 (b) a choice is
exclusive if the agreement “designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more
specific courts in one Contracting State unless the parties have expressly provided
otherwise.” Therefore, many different ways of choosing a court can be exclusive with
respect to Article 3 (b). The parties can choose the “courts of Germany.”285 They can also
choose a specific court like the “Amtsgericht Hamburg.” It would also be an exclusive
choice if the parties determine that either the “Amtsgericht Hamburg” or the
“Amtsgericht Rostock” should hear the case. The parties can choose as many specific
courts as they want as long as all those courts are in the same member state. It would also
be exclusive if the parties agree that party A may sue party B only in the “Amtsgericht
Hamburg” and party B may sue party A only in the “Amtsgericht Rostock” as long as
both courts are in the same state. The convention always speaks of states and never
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makes a distinction between states and nations for example. Referring to a state, however,
is not very specific when it comes to non-unified legal systems. For those federal states,
Article 22 of the draft sets forth that the term “State” can refer to the state as a whole or
to one of the territorial units within the state. Therefore, it would be an exclusive choice
of court agreement if the Swedish parties in the example above designate “the courts of
Canada” or “the courts of British Columbia.” A clause that designates “the state courts of
California or the federal courts located in that state” would also be regarded as
exclusive.286
The last two requirements of the definition are less complex. Reciprocity just
means that the convention only applies to exclusive choice of court agreements that
designate courts in a Contracting State, making it impossible for the convention to apply
if the parties chose a court of a state that has not signed and ratified the convention. The
last requirement (designation for the purpose of deciding disputes that have arisen or may
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship) makes clear that the choice of
court clause can include disputes that have already arisen and also covers future disputes.
Furthermore, this requirement can restrict the choice of court clause to past or future
disputes.287
Article 2 excludes certain matters from the scope of the convention. The most
important matters in this context are consumer contracts and contracts of employment.
The reasons for these exclusions were already discussed above. Besides those matters,
Article 2 expressly provides an entire laundry list of excluded matters,288 which are
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mainly excluded because they touch third party or public interests. As soon as such are
involved it is not reasonable for the contracting parties to dispose of the particular matter
between themselves.289 However, the matters in Article 1 (2) are only excluded if they do
not arise merely as an incidental question.290 Incidental questions are such that a court has
to decide in order to render a judgment.291

2. Article 5
The rules with regard to jurisdiction can be found in Article 5 (1) of the April
2004 Draft. This provision sets forth that the designated court “shall have jurisdiction to
decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void
under the law of that State.” Whether an agreement is null and void has to be determined
by the law of the State of the chosen court and refers primarily to grounds like fraud,
mistake, misrepresentation, duress, and lack of capacity. Article 5 (1) not only provides a
court with jurisdiction but also requires it to hear the case. In Article 5 (2) the draft
clarifies that the designated court cannot decline jurisdiction on the ground that the
dispute should be decided in a court of another state. Since this rule does not apply with
respect to a court in the same state, special questions arise with respect to non-unified
legal systems in this context as well.292 Furthermore, it is important to point out that the
doctrines of lis pendens and forum non conveniens addressed above cannot serve as a
ground for rejecting the jurisdiction of a court in another state. Article 3 (3) provides
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rules for the internal allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a contracting state and
makes clear that the first two paragraphs do not have any affect on it.293

3. Article 7 and 9
Assume one of the Swedish parties in the example above brings an action that is covered
by the choice of court agreement between them in a court in Belgium even though the
agreement provides a court in France with jurisdiction. This situation is typical for the
cases to which Article 7 of the April 2004 Draft applies.294 Article 7 addresses all the
courts that were not designated in the agreement and requires them to “suspend or
dismiss the proceedings” even if their national law would provide them with jurisdiction.
Without a provision like this, an exclusive choice of court agreement would be worthless.
Even though the draft does not expressly explain what it means by “proceedings” it is
clear that this term covers all proceedings that are inconsistent with the choice of court
agreement.295 There are five exceptions in Article 7 a) to e) providing cases in which the
provision does not apply. According to the first exception, Article 7 does not apply if the
agreement between the parties is void under the law that the chosen court applies. In this
case the court not chosen must apply the law of the chosen court and not its own.
Therefore the court in Belgium would have to apply French law in order to determine
whether the agreement is null and void. The second exception makes Article 7 not
applicable if a party lacked capacity to enter into an agreement. This exception has to be
determined by the law of the state of the court that was seized and not by the chosen
293
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court. In this case the Belgian court would have to apply its own rules including its own
choice-of-law rules. There is also a connection between the two exceptions since lack of
capacity would make the agreement null and void in the sense of the first exception.
Therefore, capacity has to be determined by the law of the court seized and by the court
that was chosen in the agreement.296
While the first two exceptions to Article 7 are of general nature and can be found
in other conventions, exceptions three and four are special. These exceptions cover cases
of serious injustice, violations of the public policy of the court seized of the matter, and
situations when the agreement cannot be performed because of exceptional reasons.297
All of those exceptions must be construed narrowly since they would otherwise
undermine the object and purpose of the convention. The fact that the last of the
alternatives only comes into play in cases of war in the chosen state for example
demonstrates how narrow these exceptions are to be construed.298 The last of the five
exceptions allows the seized court to exercise jurisdiction despite Article 7 if the chosen
court has decided not to hear the case.
Article 5, 7, and 9 of the April 2004 Draft are the three pillars of the “new style”
of the Hague Convention project. The third of these pillars, Article 9, simply states that a
judgment that was rendered by a court designated in an exclusive choice of court
agreement between two parties must be recognized and enforced in the courts of all other
member states. Article 9 includes six exceptions which, if they apply, give the court the
choice whether to recognize and enforce the particular judgment or not.299 This is due to
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the language chosen by the drafters (“[...] may be refused [...]”). In the context of
recognition and enforcement it is important to point out that a future Hague Convention
would not require a member state to grant a remedy that is not available under its law.300
However, it requires them to recognize and enforce the given judgment in a way that
gives the best possible effect under the rules available.301 This fact will become important
especially with respect to the enforcement of punitive damages in countries that do not
provide such a remedy in their legal system.

C. Comments
The June 2005 Diplomatic Conference may well result in the adoption of a Hague
Convention that is ready for signature and ratification. Sometimes one step back can
mean two steps forward. The atmosphere during and after the Special Commission
meeting in December 2003 shows that all sides were trying to push the Hague project
forward. It seems that the fear of making all the work pointless by not drafting a final
convention encouraged the participating parties to proceed.
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CHAPTER 6
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF IP-RIGHTS AND E-COMMERCE

More than a decade had passed since the beginnings of drafting a Hague Convention on
judgments in 1992. This is not a long period if one keeps in mind the relatively slow
development of the law in general and the difficulty of the matter to be addressed in the
proposed convention. There are fields of law, however, where ten years can seam an
eternity. In the context of intellectual property302 rights, the internet is a challenge that
forces both lawmakers and practitioners to manage a rapid and continuing process of
adaptation and adjustment. Moreover, the internet has an even bigger impact in ecommerce. In 1992, e-commerce was an expression only a few could understand since
the internet was not readily available even in developed countries. Thus, questions of
intellectual property and e-commerce were not really considered to be a major factor in
the Hague Convention negotiation process.303 Both issues, however, had a very important
impact on the negotiations and were often fields of major controversy.

A. Intellectual Property Rights
1. Article 12 Preliminary Draft Convention
In the Preliminary Draft Convention, intellectual property rights were addressed in
Article 12, which provided exclusive bases of jurisdiction for intellectual property

302
303

Hereinafter: IP.
Some commentators even stated that “it seemed that the drafters had ignored completely that newfangled thing called the Internet,“ see Hankin, supra note 75 at 1297.

73
matters.304 Article 12 (4) of the Preliminary Draft Convention sets forth language305 that
was strongly criticized306 and often described as “completely unworkable.”307 This
paragraph clarifies that both types of intellectual property rights, registered and not
registered rights, were intended to be separated and that Article 12 (4) of the Preliminary
Draft Convention only covers registered rights.308 As a consequence patents and
trademarks are addressed by Article 12 (4) Preliminary Draft Convention. Copyright
infringements, however, are treated as torts according to Article 10 of the Preliminary
Draft Convention. To the United States delegation, this result was not very reasonable
since copyrights may be registered in the United States and are often registered. As far as
the concept of “unregistered” or “common law” trademarks is concerned, it is important
to point out that the Draft Convention does not make a distinction between the
aforementioned trademarks and registered trademarks. Trademarks are expressly
mentioned in the text of Article 12 (4) Preliminary Draft Convention.309
By distinguishing between the different types of action that are related to
intellectual property problems, this provision makes another separation worth
mentioning. According to the language in the provision, the Convention would apply to
questions regarding validity but not apply to problems related to infringement or
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revocation, since these problems are still in bracketed text.310 In other words the question
of whether infringement actions should also be brought exclusively in the state of
registration was left open.311
The reactions to Article 12 of the Preliminary Draft convention were negative. As
addressed above it was described as unworkable and faced a wide front of opposition,
and in particular, criticism in the United States. The United States Patent and Trademark
Office made an attempt to get a general public response to the discussed approach by
publishing a note in the Federal Register.312 The consensus of the replies313 can be
summarized in the conclusion that the approach in the Draft Convention is not a “model
of clarity.”314 While some industry spokesmen agreed that questions of validity rather
than questions of infringement should be entitled to exclusive jurisdiction,315 others
believed that not even questions of validity should receive exclusive jurisdiction.316
Although many experts agreed with the content of Article 12 (4) Preliminary Draft
Convention in general or at least held the opinion that it was a good basis, many
questions were left unanswered.317 Article 12 Preliminary Draft Convention also did not
deal with differences in systems of intellectual property rights protection in a satisfactory
way.318
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2. The June 2001 Diplomatic Conference and its Aftermath
a. The Conference
After several expert meetings on intellectual property the discussions during the June
2001 Diplomatic Conference focused on the different types of intellectual property rights.
These rights and the legal systems created to promote and protect them were analyzed in
order to find a compromise that could satisfy all the participating delegations.319 As
addressed above, the Interim Text draft does contain bracketed language and many
alternatives indicating further need for discussion. This is especially true for Article 12
Interim Text regarding the intellectual property matter.320 Although the bracketed
language might be confusing, the message of the drafters of the Interim Text is clear: The
main issue addressed by the delegation members was whether proceedings for the
infringement of patents, marks, and such other rights that might be covered by Article 12
Interim Text should fall within the exclusive jurisdiction or not.321
Due to all of the bracketed language, this approach created more problems than it
resolved. In comparison to the approach in the Preliminary Draft Convention, even more
questions remained unanswered. Should problems regarding patents and marks be treated
differently than problems dealing with copyright issues, as done in the Interim Text? If
there were exclusive jurisdiction for patent and trademark issues, should these issues only
apply to questions of validity322 or also to questions of infringement?323 However, one
question seemed key not only to the further development in the negotiations of the
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intellectual property matters but also the negotiation of the proposed Hague Convention
as a whole. The question was whether it is better that intellectual property rights be
excluded from the scope of the convention. The answer to this question will be discussed
later in this thesis. In sum, the issue remained whether intellectual property right
problems would be too connected with other subjects like tort and contract issues, making
separate treatment undesirable.

b. Alternative Proposals
While the original Hague Convention was intended to be broad and inclusive in order to
cover most civil and commercial litigation, an alternative proposal dealt exclusively with
issues of intellectual property. This proposal was suggested by the American law
Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg is appropriately named the “2001 Dreyfuss-GinsburgProposal.”324 This proposal addressed two questions. Firstly, the drafters of this proposal
intended to make the U.S. Intellectual Property Bar reflect on the possibility of creating a
regime for international enforcement of intellectual property law judgments in the event
that the Hague Conference project failed or did not cover rules for the solution of
disputes in the field of intellectual property law.325 Secondly, the proposal raises the
question of whether a convention which focused exclusively on intellectual property
matters and which raised questions in this unique context would have advantages over the
Hague Convention solution.326 One of the main reasons for providing an alternative
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approach was the creation of efficiency in international intellectual property disputes327
and the new challenges that are posed by the new cyber world realities.328
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg-Proposal, which is also designed in a mixed convention
style,329 was adapted from the Preliminary Draft Convention,330 though significant
changes were made. First, the scope of the proposal was limited to countries that are
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the “Agreement on Trade –
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,”331 the so called “TRIPs –
Agreement.”332 Thus, the proposal basically covered the same rights that are covered by
the intellectual property portion of TRIPs, with the addition of three extensions and one
exception to the rights included by the TRIPs – Agreement.333 The main idea behind the
use of established TRIPs rules is easily identifiable: Countries joining the TRIPs –
Agreement have agreed to enforce intellectual property laws and have worked out special
dispute resolution proceedings which they can apply if the enforcement process should
fail.334 Forum shopping to undermine or weaken the several approaches of the different
nations to govern the relationship between users and owners of intellectual property is
meant to be outweighed by this scope limitation.335 Because of its general and broader
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scope, the Proposed Hague Convention was often confronted with this forum shopping
argument.336
Of special importance was the exception mentioned above that excluded patent
litigation from the scope of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg-Proposal.337 The proposal focused on
copyrights with the intention of addressing disputes regarding copyright protected
material and therefore dealt with concerns raised by copyright owners.338 The DreyfussGinsburg-Proposal also differed in other area from the Preliminary Draft Convention.
Changes were made, or additional provisions were provided regarding jurisdictional
rules,339 contract disputes, infringement actions, consolidation, remedies, and choice of
law.340

c. Aftermath of the 2001 Conference
As the many alternatives in the Interim Text indicated, there was still a need for further
discussion on the matter of intellectual property rights in the Convention. During the first
meeting of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project there was discussion
on whether it would be reasonable to exclude some intellectual property rights from the
treaty. Patents and trademarks were intended to be excluded from the treaty while
copyrights were to be covered. The delegations gathered again at the second meeting of
336
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the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project. One state came up with the
suggestion to include all intellectual property rights into the scope of the convention if the
convention were to be limited to choice of court clauses,341 which was the current
approach in the negotiations of the Hague Convention at that time. The idea behind this
suggestion was to protect commercial parties, which usually include choice of court
clauses in their licensing agreements. Such a convention was considered to be the ideal
tool to intensify and protect such decisions by the parties involved.342 The reason for the
protection was respect of the parties’ choice. If they agreed on a court to settle their
disputes, this court should be able to decide all issues, and therefore, all intellectual
property matters and not only some.
An objection one could raise could be the infringement case problem that was
already identified earlier in the 2001 negotiations. In these infringement cases the validity
would be raised by the infringer as a defense in order to get exclusive jurisdiction since
validity was subject to exclusive jurisdiction under the convention.343 Pure infringement
cases between parties that were not bound by any contractual relationship and that had no
other relationship of any kind would be subject to another exclusive jurisdiction besides
the exclusive tort jurisdiction. But the fact that the substantive scope of the treaty was
narrowed to choice of court clauses makes the difference in comparison with the
negotiations in 2001 and before. With the new approach it became very unlikely that such
a setting could lead to an exclusive jurisdiction that is unjustified since the infringing
person could now only be one of the parties. Thus, the problems identified during the
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negotiations in 2001 would seem to be solved since they will not arise in the contractlicense-litigation.344 To meet some concerns it was suggested that express language be
included providing that any judgment rendered on the basis of a choice of court clause
would neither have any effect on registration authorities nor on the validity of a
trademark.345 Other participants indicated agreement with the inclusion of all intellectual
property rights as long as the modifications described above are explicitly mentioned in
the convention.346
There was much interest in how the third meeting of the Working Group on the
Judgments Project would deal with the intellectual property issue in the newly edited
draft that was announced for this meeting. When the text of the treaty was first shown,
the intellectual property issue that was earlier identified as one of the most controversial
matters was set aside and made part of the second stage issues. However, at the beginning
of the new drafting process it was pointed out that the intellectual property issue could
reappear on the agenda of matters that were likely to be included within the scope of the
Hague Convention later on. One main reason for the confidence expressed in the
reappearance of intellectual property rights in the text was the fact that Andrea Schultz,
first secretary of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project was an expert in
intellectual property law.347
The early hopes of an inclusion of intellectual property matters in the Convention
probably disappeared, since the Preliminary Result draft of the Working Group in form of
a new draft, which was released at the third meeting of the Working Group, declared that
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the convention would not apply to proceedings related to the “validity of patents,
trademarks and [other intellectual property rights – to be defined].”348 The drafters thus
excluded the issue of validity of patents and trademarks from the scope of the convention
and indicated by the bracketed language provided above that exclusion of other
intellectual property rights could be possible.
The December 2003 Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreement, did not lead
to a conclusion regarding the intellectual property issue either. Proceedings involving the
validity of patents and trademarks as well as other intellectual property rights whose
validity arises from their registration were still not included in the convention.349 As
mentioned above, however, Article 1 (4) of the December 2003 Draft made it possible to
cover those matters if they arise merely as an incidental question. The inclusion of this
provision rendered an old questions but this time in a new context: should a particular
country’s court be able to hear a case involving an incidental question related to a patent
or trademark when the patent or trademark had not been granted in that country? A
separate discussion of this matter is not necessary, since the main problem remains the
same in the sense that it involves a decision by a court in a case involving intellectual
property rights whose validity arises from their registration in another country.

3. The April 2004 Draft
The intellectual property provisions in the April 2004 draft have been reformulated.
However, despite of the different wording in Article 2 (2)(k) of the April 2004 Draft there
is no indication that a change in policy was intended. The fact that the entire Article 2
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(2)(k) of the April 2004 Draft is set forth in bracketed language is a sign of the lack of
agreement on the intellectual property issues. According to the latest draft language,
copyrights and related rights350 are still fully covered by the convention whereas all other
intellectual property rights are excluded from the scope, “except in proceedings pursuant
to a contract which licenses or assigns such intellectual property rights.”351 This wording
is more confusing than the one chosen in the December 2003 Draft, and it is not entirely
clear at first glance what the drafters intended to express with this language. However,
comparing the December 2003 approach and the present one makes clear that they both
basically come to the same policy result: copyrights and related rights are fully included
in the scope of the convention and questions with respect to the validity of all other
intellectual property rights, like patents and trademarks for example, are not included.
The discussions below will demonstrate how the wording in the April 2004 Draft reaches
this policy result.
The complicated wording in Article 2 (2)(k) April 2004 Draft was due to the fact
that the negotiators did not want the validity of patents and trademarks, for example, to
be covered by the convention. However, they tried to include disputes over licenses in
other countries into the scope of the convention. The problem with this intention was that
all a violator of a license would have to do in order to prevent the application of the
convention is to argue that the particular intellectual property right is not valid.352 The
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wording in Article 2 (2)(k) April 2004 Draft was set forth to avoid such scenarios.
“Proceedings pursuant to a contract” does not mean anything else than proceedings to
enforce substantive rights under a contract, to obtain damages for the breach of such
rights, to obtain payment of royalties under the contract, to interpret a contract, to set it
aside, to declare that it never existed, or to obtain a declaration of non-liability under it.353
All those proceedings concern either the transfer or the use of intellectual property rights
other than copyrights and related rights. Therefore, questions regarding the validity of
such intellectual property rights cannot be considered “proceedings pursuant to a
contract” which means that they are not covered by the convention if they arise as an
principal issue.354 However, if they arise merely as an incidental question, they are
covered according to Article 2 (3) of the April 2004 Draft.
Even in this case, though, rulings on these questions would not be subject to
recognition and enforcement according to Article 10 (2) of the April 2004 Draft.
Therefore, if the violator of a patent license agreement raises the invalidity of the patent
as a defense to a claim that is covered by the convention, the court can decide on the
validity issue as an incidental question. Despite the defense and the court ruling on it, the
proceedings would still be within the scope of the convention as a consequence of Article
2 (3) April 2004 Draft. The ruling on the validity issue, however, is not enforceable under
the convention due to Article 10 (2) April 2004 Draft.355
After this clarification it remains to be pointed out that negotiating parties
intended to cover a wide range of contracts that deal with the transfer and use of
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intellectual property rights other than copyrights and related rights. Examples are license
agreements, agreements to assign an intellectual property right, and distribution contracts
if they involve intellectual property.356 Infringement proceedings were also intended to be
included in the convention. Therefore, the convention could apply in cases where the
scope of an intellectual property right other than a copyright or copyright related right is
in question. The bracketed language in sub – paragraph k) would only clarify this intent.
The brackets are due to the fact that the negotiating parties could not agree on whether
clarifying words with respect to this matter are necessary.357

4. Comments
All of these facts, various approaches, suggestions, and thoughts raise multiple questions.
Is it reasonable to exclude intellectual property matters completely from the scope of the
proposed Hague Convention? Is an inclusion in part reasonable or does a later Hague
Convention only make sense if all intellectual property rights are included in the
framework of such a treaty? That this question cannot be answered in a way that provides
an approach that is both clear in its application and accepted by all the different parties
seems to be evident considering the controversial discussions up to this point. When the
first draft of the Hague Convention, the Preliminary Draft Convention, was issued to the
public, only copyrights were intended to be excluded from its scope. Now, after years of
discussion copyrights are the only intellectual property rights that are still included in the
most recent edition of the draft.
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In sum, two questions have to be answered. Does the Hague Convention really
need intellectual property rights within its scope in order to be successful and
meaningful? If yes, what types of intellectual property rights should be included?
Professor Dreyfuss and Professor Ginsburg might be right in remarking that the
application of intellectual property rights would be much easier if they are included in a
convention that only covers intellectual property rights. However, they forget a very
important point. Only the Hague Conference can offer the appropriate legal environment
to draft a convention unifying law that is applicable and accepted worldwide. Universal
application is exactly what judicial decisions on intellectual property need in order to
achieve final and foreseeable outcomes. Intellectual property is one of the fields of law
that does not take into consideration legal borders. Drafting a convention that is the
perfect approach for only some delegations does not make sense in the long term.
Therefore, the treatment of intellectual property rights has to be regulated under the
umbrella of a regime that allows the participation of as many countries as possible. The
Hague Conference can offer the negotiating environment that is necessary to draft such a
convention. However, is it necessary to do so within the Hague Convention project? The
recent stage of the negotiations have shown that the project has lost much of its
importance in view of the exclusion of certain important issues. Although there were
reasons for these exclusions, every effort should be made to re-insert these pertinent
issues. It is possible that at least some intellectual property matters will get included in a
later convention. However, bracketed language in the April 2004 Draft still leaves doubts
about this inclusion. Allowing the opportunity of including intellectual property matters
to pass is unreasonable especially after the reduction of the scope of the convention to
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choice of court clauses. Therefore, inclusion of intellectual property seems not only a
reasonable consideration with respect to the unification of the law on choice of court
clauses in intellectual property, but seems also to be of at least some importance for the
overall recognition of the Hague Convention.
Even after the reduction of the scope to choice of forum clauses, critics of the
convention made remarks that demonstrated once more a completely wrong attitude
towards the project. Some stated that even after the narrowing of the proposed convention
there is still the likelihood that some troublesome issues will not disappear.358 Such
statements demonstrate what was wrong with the project. Instead of trying to resolve
troublesome issues and matters, some interest groups appeared to wish to avoid
confrontation and consequently lost sight of the ultimate goal of the project and the “big
picture.” The new narrow treaty can provide a proficient tool to establish reasonable
intellectual property litigation. The approach that was initially suggested in the outcome
of the second meeting of the Informal Working Group359 could be the proper way to
solve the problem. The reduction to choice of court clauses opens the way to implement
all intellectual property rights in a way that minimizes the danger of misuse of this
inclusion. Concerns regarding the complete inclusion of intellectual property matters
could be countered by excluding questions of validity from the scope of the convention.
The latest draft has done that by including language that expressly states that any
judgments rendered on the basis of a choice of court clause would not have any effect on
the validity of certain intellectual property rights.
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Concerns were explicitly brought up with respect to trademarks. The International
Trademark Organization believed that under the drafts that did not address the issue of
the validity of trademarks, there was a danger that foreign courts that may not have any
expertise in trademark matter could hear such matters: “What we would like and what we
believe is essential for trademark owners is that only courts or agencies of a government
in which the trademark arose should be able to determine whether a mark is entitled to
registration there and whether a mark there has been infringed.”360 The idea that
trademark law deserves more protection since it is territorial might be right, but to deny
courts in other countries the ability to apply foreign rules to a given problem, or to
investigate foreign rules seems unreasonable. Due to the highly connected markets today,
applying foreign law in one’s own country is not unusual. The April 2004 Draft addresses
these concerns and resolves the issue by including the described language with respect to
the validity of trademarks among other intellectual property rights. Trademark law can
now stay territorial and the danger of infringing persons using the issue of validity to
obtain jurisdiction no longer exists since the scope of the convention was limited to
choice of court agreements.
There is one more open question with respect to the intellectual property issue.
Should the scope of the Convention also cover matters regarding the validity of
intellectual property rights other than copyrights and related rights if those are not raised
as merely incidental questions? The main argument against an inclusion of proceedings to
revoke an intellectual property right other than copyright and related rights would be
similar to the one voiced by the International Trademark Organization: courts should not
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be able to decide about intellectual property rights that arose in another country.
However, denying a court’s ability to resolve a case applying foreign law is not
reasonable in the time of globalization. Furthermore, why does the draft convention
imply that foreign courts are capable to decide on questions of validity if they arise as
incidental questions but denies them this capability if the question would be the subject of
the proceedings. If a court finds a patent to be invalid in an incidental question and
renders a judgment on this ground, it does not make sense to give effect to the
enforcement and recognition of this judgment without doing the same with respect to the
incidental question as a separate or independent issues since the decision on the issue as
an incidental question most likely influenced the outcome of the judgment. This example
demonstrates that there is still much to discuss about regarding the inclusion of
intellectual property in the Convention. It also demonstrates that a complete inclusion of
all intellectual property matters is not as unlikely as many negotiators portray. However,
as of the present situation a full inclusion of all intellectual property matters including
questions of validity of patents and trademarks is not likely. Even if the June 2005
Diplomatic Conference will not reach this result it will hopefully adopt standard set forth
by the April 2004 Draft.

B. E-Commerce
The e-commerce issue was not expected to determine the negotiation process when the
idea of negotiating a new Hague Convention arose. However, it soon became a
significant issue. E-commerce took up a large portion of the time available for the
negotiations, since the increasing importance of the internet and the rapidly advancing
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technology could not be ignored.361 Transactions concluded over the internet were not an
unusual phenomenon. In fact, everyone who is able to use the internet is able to
participate in such transactions. This undoubtedly led to an increasing number of disputes
arising out of transactions concluded over the internet. Against this background the
drafters of the new convention realized that they have to address the e-commerce issue in
order to keep the negotiations and their possible outcome up-to-date.362 This part of the
thesis addresses the e-commerce issue by providing important information regarding the
history and development of the negotiation process after reviewing the background of the
rise of electronic commerce. The main focus will be on the e-commerce issue as it relates
to consumer transactions.

1.What is E-Commerce?
The rise of e-commerce is due to the fact that the internet is accessible for nearly
everyone for relatively little money. A person can access a world market in no time while
sitting in an armchair in his living room. This has not only changed the way consumers
think, behave and interact but it also modified the way business is conducted and changed
how our society functions.363 One does not have to refer to statistics to realize the impact
that the internet and e-commerce has had in recent years.364 In the 1990s under President
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Clinton, for instance, the United States strongly encouraged the development and
expansion of e-commerce.365 A concrete result of the new attention given to this matter
was the “Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act” signed by
President Clinton in 2000.366 The new statute does not only recognize the validity of
electronic contracts, electronic signatures, notices, and other electronic records, but also
allows the involved parties to choose the technology they want to use for authenticating
their transactions without any involvement by the government.367 This is only one
example of modernization in this particular area in the United States.368
There are two different types of e-commerce contracts or transactions that are
important in the context discussed here, the so called business-to-business contracts and
business-to-consumer contracts. Business-to-consumer e-commerce is “commerce using
the internet to conduct business with consumers” which results in internet consumers
buying or accessing information via the internet from business entities.369 Business-toconsumer e-commerce contracts are concluded over the internet rather than by using the
traditional face-to-face approach or mail media.370 Likewise, a business-to-business e-
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commerce contract is a contract between two business entities concluded over the
internet, for example.

2. Existing Approaches to Consumer Contracts
The following remarks give a short overview of the consumer protection provisions in
Europe and in the USA. Pure consumer protection provisions will be described as well as
such provisions that were exclusively made for the protection of consumers involved in
e-commerce on the internet.

a. The European Union
Consumer protection rules in Europe relevant for e-commerce can be found in
conventions and regulations as well as in specific directions on the matter.

i. Conventions
Consumer protection has played a big role in the law of different countries in
Europe371 and in the European Union.372 As mentioned above, the European Union
adopted the 1968 Brussels Convention. The provisions of the Brussels Convention
require physical presence in order to determine which court has jurisdiction. Only those
claims that arise from that presence can be brought. It should be noted that the Rome
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Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations373 also includes provisions
on cross-border conflicts that are relevant to electronic contracting by consumers.

ii. EU Regulations
The European Union member states soon realized that e-commerce was going to
become more and more important not only for the industry but also for daily life.
Therefore, in an attempt to support e-commerce in Europe the European Union’s Council
of Ministers included some language regarding consumer contracts in the Brussels
Regulation (Council Regulation No. 44/2001)374 which became effective in March 2002.
According to this regulation the country in which the consumer resides will have
jurisdiction over the dispute when a merchant “pursues commercial or professional
activities in the member state of the consumer’s domicile, or by any means, directs such
activities to that Member State.”375 In other words, consumers under the Brussels
Regulation are now permitted to sue foreign operators of internet sites that market
directly to the home country of the consumer in the consumer’s own courts. The
consumer may choose where to sue his opponent while the consumer can only be sued at
his domicile. A prior selection of a forum which is conflicting with these rules is not
possible.376 The consequences are significant for sellers who want to sell their products
online. They have to comply with the laws in all EU-member states in order to avoid suits
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by consumers.377 The difference between provisions in the new regulation and the
Brussels Convention is found in the reach of consumer protection. While the Brussels
Convention system was designed for the passive consumer, the new regulatory
framework protects every consumer who enters in contractual contact with a supplier
who is active in the consumer’s state of domicile. With respect to e-commerce it is
therefore sufficient if there is an offer of goods or services contained on a web site that
can be downloaded by the consumer on his computer.378 The level of protection offered
to the consumer by this regulatory language is high, since all litigation in connection with
consumer contracts that were entered into by means of e-commerce will take place in the
consumer’s country of residence.379 An exception to this general principle can only be
made if the consumer had chosen to do so by expressly stating that he preferred to litigate
abroad.380 It seems important to point out, however, that these remarks are not relevant in
a situation where the European consumer, living in a member country of the European
Union, enters in contractual contact with suppliers from a non EU country like the United
States, unless this supplier is acting through a European branch office or subsidiary.381
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The Brussels Regulation was passed in the middle of the negotiations for the new
Hague Convention. Instead of waiting for the outcome of the negotiations the European
Union went ahead382 and thereby sent a message to the other delegations and to the
United States in particular.383 Although the negotiations for the Hague Convention were
not free of problems prior to the enactment of the Brussels Regulation they became more
difficult thereafter.384 In the debate after the release of the Preliminary Draft Convention,
which will be discuss later, the European Union often pointed out that they were not
willing to change their existing approach to the consumer protection rules unless the
change would include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms specifically online
dispute resolution methods.385

iii. EU – Directives
Some EU directives are directly related to e-commerce consumer protection and
will be described here to provide a more complete picture of the European approach to
consumer protection. The first directive to be discussed is the Distance Selling
Directive,386 which deals mainly with contracting through the World Wide Web or
through e-mail.387 The limitation of this directive is that it does not apply to the area of
financial services. However, this legal gap was closed by the Distance Marketing
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Directive388 which was adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council on
September 23, 2002 almost four years after it was initially proposed.389 Another directive
that is related to the e-commerce protection matter is Directive 2000/31/EC on “Certain
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services in the Internal Market,” usually referred to
as “Directive on Electronic Commerce.”390 This directive addresses internal market
aspects and is therefore not as concerned with consumer protection.391

b. United States
While there are a number of e-consumer protection provisions in the European legal
system, the U.S. is often referred to as less advanced in this area.392 Because of a lack of
consumer protection provisions, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) along with various
other trade agencies apply traditional law to the current problems of the internet.393
In U.S. law one has to look at state statutes and case law when searching for
provisions regarding e-commerce transactions. While state enactments of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) apply to transactions involving goods, services are governed by
the common law of the various states. Transactions involving digital information, on the
other hand, are governed by state enactments of the Uniform Computer Information
Transaction Act (UCITA).394 The UCITA is a draft model law applying to computer
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information transactions, which is highly controversial because of its unifying
provisions.395 It was approved and recommended for state adoption by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 1999. In particular, the
UCITA regulates agreements to create, modify, transfer or distribute computer software,
computer data and databases as well as internet and online information.396 This law is
controversial and has only been enacted in two states thus far.397 Further enactments by
other states is unforeseeable at this point.398 The controversy exists because there is no
agreement on whether the UCITA actually increases consumer protection. While some
academics hold the view that there is a lack of appropriate consumer protection
provisions in the UCITA,399 others refer to it as expanding consumer protection in the
United States.400
If a state has not adopted the UCITA rules, most of the transactions involving any
kind of digital information are covered by the UCC as transactions involving goods.401
Despite the fact that parties contract entirely over the internet, they do not lose protection
by the UCC since §§ 2-204 and 2-206 do not require formal rules for offer and
acceptance.402 In addition, the Statute of Frauds and the Parole Evidence Rule are also
applicable to sales conducted on the internet.403
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3. Article 7, Preliminary Draft Convention
The drafters of the first Preliminary Draft Convention of 1999404 could not avoid
including a provision involving language resolving problems related to e-commerce.
What Article 12 of the Preliminary Draft Convention was for intellectual property,
Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft Convention was for the e-commerce.405 This provision
covers contracts concluded by consumers and therefore raised obvious questions
regarding e-commerce.406 Paragraph 3 of the provision, which basically stated that a
forum selection clause conflicting with the language in Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft
Convention would not be valid was the subject of much discussion. First, it was claimed
that Article 7, paragraph 3 could lead to a lack of predictability in connection with
electronic consumer contracts since it does not recognize choice of court clauses that are
entered into prior to a dispute.407 However, this is the same in the Council Regulation No.
44/2001.408 The problems did not lay in the details of paragraph 3. Rather, the whole
provision received harsh criticism from some delegations at the negotiations. Once again,
the United States Department of State objected to the approach in Article 7 Preliminary

404

See supra note 61.
See id. art. 7.
406
Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft Convention (“Contracts Concluded by Consumers“) reads as follows:
“1. A plaintiff who concluded a contract for a purpose which is outside its trade or profession, hereafter
designated as the consumer, may bring a claim in the courts of the State in which it is habitually
resident, if a) the conclusion of the contract on which the claim is based is related to trade or
professional activities that the defendant has engaged in or directed to that State, in particular in
soliciting business through means of publicity, and b) the consumer has taken the steps necessary for
the conclusion of the contract in that State. 2. A claim against the consumer may only be brought by a
person who entered into the contract in the course of its trade or profession before the courts of the State
of the habitual residence of the consumer. 3. The parties to a contract within the meaning of paragraph 1
may, by an agreement which conforms with the requirements of Article 4, make a choice of court a) if
such agreement is entered into after the dispute has arisen, or b) to the extend only that it allows the
consumer to bring proceedings in another court.”
407
See Brand, supra note 35 at 597.
408
See Council Regulation No. 44/2001, supra note 25.
405

98
Draft Convention and made this clear in a letter to the Hague Conference.409 In this letter
Jeffrey Kovar, then the head of the American delegation, claimed that Article 7 of the
Preliminary Draft Convention “raised a storm of controversy in the electronic commerce
world.”410 The e-commerce and internet communities in the U.S. expressed concerns over
the approach included in the draft and publicly announced their disagreements with the
draft Convention’s jurisdictional framework in articles of major U.S. newspapers and
other magazines.411 Why this storm of controversy broke out in the United States is not
clear to everyone.412 One of the main concerns expressed was the fear that the Hague
Convention would allow copyright owners to look for courts abroad whose judgments
would satisfy their needs and then return to the United States to seek enforcement of
these judgments where a different approach to the same laws might exist.413
The fear of the e-commerce world in the U.S. can be barely understood. Even
without the Hague Convention, American e-commerce suppliers already have to deal
with cases in where they are sued by customers from around the world. Local procedural
rules make this possible. Only one example is the decision by a French Court which
imposed criminal liability against Yahoo! and Yahoo! France.414 Yahoo! had sold Nazi
material to French citizens, and although the material in question was available only for
auction on Yahoo!’s auction sites in the United States the French court declared that it
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had jurisdiction.415 It has become clear for internet and e-commerce companies in general
and for American internet and e-commerce companies in particular that there may not
longer be protection against liability abroad for actions that were legally taken at home.416
Since American e-commerce suppliers are already subject to suits filed abroad, a
future Hague Convention covering e-commerce would not increase the threat for U.S. ecommerce. On the contrary, it would help to harmonize the law in this particular field
because the U.S. e-commerce industry is not the only industry already confronted with
suits brought elsewhere. European e-commerce suppliers face the same problem. Longarm statutes and the so called “minimum contracts doctrine” make them subjects to suits
initiated in the United States.
The general statement by the United States delegation was that it would be
impossible for the U.S. to adopt rules, in the context of Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft
Convention, which would require businesses to be subject to suit in the courts of a
consumer’s country of residence. In particular, the United States had problems with the
way the text of the Convention addressed choice of forum clauses. Stating that Article 7
of the proposed Convention would “create an absolute rule against choice of forum
clauses in consumer contracts” they made clear what their position was and also gave the
reason for why they opposed the approach in Article 7 Preliminary Draft Convention.417
In contending that it was not possible for the U.S. to agree to a choice of an exclusive in
the draft convention, the United States delegation furthermore emphasized that such a
415
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provision contradicted domestic U.S. law since the choice of law approach in the UCITA
was the complete opposite to Article 7 Preliminary Draft Convention.418
In recent domestic cases, U.S. courts pointed out that if a company does business
via its web site in a consumer’s home state it should expect to be sued in that state. These
courts thus made web site owners subject to suit in consumer home states in the event of
an alleged breach of contract.419 Why then does the U.S. Supreme Court decline to
subject web site owners to suits in other countries when the same owners could be sued in
many other different states within the U.S.?420 Not considering differences in judicial
systems, is there a difference between the distance between a consumer on the west coast
and a website owner on the east coast in the U.S. and the distance between a web site
owner in Vancouver, Canada and a consumer living in Seattle? Against the background
of these considerations the point of view of the U.S. delegation in the Hague negotiations
appears to contradict the recent trend by U.S. courts. 421
There are further arguments that do not support the position of the U.S.
delegation. One can argue about the reasonableness of expecting a U.S. plaintiff, who is a
consumer in the state of Washington to travel across the country to sue a supplier situated
in Florida.422 However, one can normally not expect a consumer to go to another country
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in order to sue the supplier.423 The international setting is not only special because of the
problem with long distances. Other problems like language, increased costs for suits, and
less knowledge about the foreign legal system come in on the consumer side. These
problems may also appear on the supplier’s side. However, apart from one-man
businesses the supplier side of the contractual relationship seems to have the greater
financial ability to face the problems of litigating abroad.

4. The June 2001 Diplomatic Conference
The drafters of the Preliminary Draft Convention knew that the approach with respect to
e-commerce was not good enough to cover all the problems this issue would bring about.
Proof for this is a solitary footnote to the Preliminary Draft Convention, which
announced an upcoming meeting by a group of specialists in early 2000.424 The Hague
Conference realized that there was plenty to do before the June 2001 Diplomatic
Conference. The first meeting on the issue was held from February 28 to March 1 in 2000
in Ottawa, Canada. The summary of the outcome of the Ottawa Meeting was simple and
obvious. The experts stated that Article 7 of the Preliminary Draft Convention was not
appropriate for application to business-to-consumer contracts since it “[...] was prepared
without taking account of the issues relating to electronic commerce.”425 The problems in
the business-to-consumer setting became the essential point of the entire negotiation
process. This fact is the main reason why the e-commerce issue became so important.
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However, the internet made e-commerce and the business-to-consumer relationships
inseparable.
Although the experts detected weak points in the Preliminary Draft Convention
with respect to e-commerce, they expressly pointed out in the conclusion of their report
that there was no suggestion of excluding e-commerce from the scope of a later treaty.426
On the contrary, many experts held the opinion that every necessary measure should be
taken to “adapt the convention to the needs of e-commerce”427 in a way that guarantees
certainty and predictability.428 The participants of the Ottawa meeting acknowledged a
series of problems they had with the draft. Two issues they had with Article 7 of the
Preliminary Draft Convention are summarized below.
The report expressly pointed out disagreement with the approach in Article 7 (1)
of the Preliminary Draft Convention dealing with the requirements for the consumer to
institute proceedings in the courts of his habitual residence. While the first condition in
subparagraph a) will always be met in an e-commerce setting, the second condition in
subparagraph b) causes more trouble. In order to use the courts of his habitual residence
for the settlement of conflicts with the other contract party, the consumer “must have
taken the necessary steps to conclude the contract in his state of residence.”429 However,
modern means of telecommunication make it possible for its users to access it nearly
everywhere in the world. Contracts can be concluded in a place different from the
habitual residence of the user who is usually a consumer.430 This fact, however, carries no
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“special implication for the purpose of deciding which courts have jurisdiction.”431 But
what does it mean to “conclude a contract in another place”? Is the contract really
concluded in the place where the consumer uses the facilities to go on the internet? Is it
not rather concluded on the internet itself? But was is the internet? Is it what everybody
usually confers to as Cyberspace? But what is cyberspace and is there a justification to
speak of a jurisdiction that is unique for the cyberspace that can be separated from other
types of jurisdiction?432
The next important problem the participants of the Ottawa meeting had with the
draft was the language of Article 7 (3) Preliminary Draft Convention creating a
conservative approach to choice of court clauses. It was pointed out that previous
discussions of the Special Commission suggested “that a consumer who is fully informed
of his rights could decide to forgo the protection available under Article 7 and opt instead
for a choice of court clause.”433 Regarding the validity of such choice of court clauses the
report of the Ottawa meeting followed the initiative of the American Bar Association434
and picked up the approach of the Geneva Round Table435 on the same issue. This round
table suggested to accept pre-dispute choice of court clauses as valid if the law of the
consumer’s habitual residence treated them as valid.436 Even though there was no
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http://www.ascusc.org./jcmc/vol2/issue1/juris.html (last visited January 22, 2005) (arguing that
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consensus regarding this issue, the door for the enforcement of pre-dispute choice of
court clauses seemed to be left open.437
These problems and all other open questions in connection with them demonstrate
only a small portion of the difficulties that the discussions regarding Article 7 of the
Preliminary Draft Convention in the e-commerce context had to face during the Ottawa
meeting.438Another meeting on the same issue had been held from February 26 to March
1 in 2001. The outcome of both meetings resulted in a new approach to Article 7, which
was negotiated at the June 2001 Diplomatic Conference.439 The lack of consensus among
the different delegations is illustrated in the number of alternatives in Article 7 of the
Interim Text. Each of the four alternatives would lead in a different direction. The
number of alternatives proliferated to such an extend, that even the exclusion of ecommerce was suggested.440

5. Later Discussions and Developments
After the June 2001 Diplomatic Conference the negotiating parties realized that they had
to begin anew in order to succeed in adopting a final convention, and thus, focused on
choice of court agreements in business-to-business contracts as addressed above. Due to
the highly controversial discussion about consumer contracts related to e-commerce,
contracts involving at least one consumer were excluded from the scope of the treaty, and
the issue of jurisdiction to hear e-commerce and other internet related disputes were
moved to the so called second stage of the negotiations. “Second stage issues” are to be
437

See Martin, supra note 361 at 139.
For a complete summary of all the remarks to Article 7 that were made in the report see supra note 425
at 6 ff.
439
Interim Text, supra note 178, art. 7.
440
Id. at footnote 43.
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on the agenda for negotiations after a final Hague Convention is adopted. The current
April 2004 Draft excludes consumer contracts from its scope, and thus does not offer any
changes for consumers. Therefore, contracts involving consumers will continue to be
treated in Europe and the United States as has been described above.441
One of the tasks of this thesis has been to analyze whether an exclusion of
business-to-consumer contracts from the scope of the Convention is reasonable, and what
impact the inclusion or exclusion would have on consumer protection. In discussing these
problems two different questions have to be distinguished. Firstly, is it reasonable to
completely exclude consumer contracts from the scope of the Convention? Secondly, is
the current style of the convention which focuses on choice of court agreements suitable
for the consumer issue?
As far as the first question is concerned, the essential point seems to be that even
if the Convention does not include consumer contracts and business-to-consumer ecommerce transactions, such a treaty would nonetheless be a great step toward
unification in the field of law discussed here.442 However, the appropriateness of such a
step may be doubted. Examples already given above demonstrate that in some parts of
the world, consumer protection in the e-commerce sector is not well-developed. The
United States is a good example to demonstrate that this is not only true for less
developed countries, but also for those regions of the world where consumer protection
and e-consumer transaction protection are being discussed.
Furthermore, even regions with high consumer protection standards face
uncertainty and unpredictability in the age of the internet. Since the internet connects

441
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See supra part VI.B.2.a. and b.
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 361 at 159.
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individuals, businesses, and markets all over the world, the consumer protection in these
particular regions reaches its limits. For instance, if a consumer in Sienna, Italy buys a
new camera via the internet from a supplier in the U.S. and has problems with the product
later, the Brussels Regulation does not help him if he wants to sue the supplier. In the
long term, situations like this will put off consumers from contracting via the internet
since they face uncertainties that do not exist in situations where the product is bought in
a retail store. It is clear that such a scenario would not even be in the interest of the
delegations that oppose the inclusion of business-to-consumer contracts into the Hague
Convention. Even though choice of court clauses in business-to-business contracts is an
important matter, they have not been the principle concern of the Hague drafters.
In 2004, 10% of the United States economy was represented by transactions by
small businesses using e-merchant technology.443 This underlines the importance of the
language in the April 2004 Draft. There can be no doubt that the convention in its current
version would do a great deal in terms of predictability and uniformity with respect to
choice of court clauses in e-commerce transactions in the business-to-business setting. On
the other hand, it must be clear that at least most of the small business transactions in
some way involve transactions with consumers. Most of these businesses completely
depend on the relationship to consumers to whom they offer goods and services.
Concentrating on regional markets within the various nations is one way to look at the
problem. Another way is to face the problem with eyes looking through international
glasses. From the American perspective, pan-European and international networks are
evolving and provide new grounds for e-merchant services that would create new jobs
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and other opportunities for the American market. Therefore, growing consumer interest
and good regulatory control can only be in the best interest of the U.S. This is one reason
why the consumer issue should have been included in the scope of the contract. As the
discussions above have shown, the gap between the different points of views would not
be so great if the influence from factors outside the legal field did not receive too much
consideration. It seems that industry interests often play a role that is not balanced by a
lobby representing consumers. The United States clearly highly influential in the
negotiations. While there had been extensive business sector involvement in the
negotiations of the Hague Convention,444 consumer advocacy groups were only briefed
on the draft Convention one week before the February 2000 Ottawa meeting.445
Furthermore, America’s most influential consumer group, The Consumer Project on
Technology (CPTech)446 was not allowed to attend the Hague negotiations as a part of the
American delegation.447 Even though this situation has changed somewhat in the recent
history of the negotiations, one could argue that had there been more involvement by
consumer groups from the beginning the exclusion of consumer contracts from the scope
of the convention would have been prevented.
Assuming that the negotiators try to add consumer contracts to the scope of the
convention, the issue then becomes how this can be done under a convention that focuses
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on choice of court agreements. While the supporter of the consumer side do not favor
choice of law provisions in consumer contracts, the business lobby would do everything
to include them in the convention. The reasons for these opposing viewpoints are
clarified through the following example. In dealing with the public, the Microsoft
Corporation established a practice that faced the consumers with ‘take it or leave it
contracts.’ According to this policy, consumers must either accept King County,
Washington, the seat of the Microsoft Corporation, as the place whose courts will resolve
all the disputes regarding the contract between the parties, or decline the contractual
relation with Microsoft.448 The establishment of a regime that enforces choice of court
clauses in consumer contracts would not only give “big players” in the business sector the
opportunity to put pressure on consumers. If consumers are not automatically able to
bring suit in the courts of their home countries, choice of court clauses will become a tool
for medium and smaller businesses where they can take away the protection consumers
need due to their weaker position.
A reasonable approach seems to be the one of the Brussels Regulation. It states
that the consumer may choose were to sue the opposing party while the consumer can
only be sued at his or her domicile. It also forbids a prior selection of a forum which
conflicts with these rules. This could be the biggest problem considering the limitation of
the present draft to choice of court agreements. However, it is important to establish such
or similar approaches in e-commerce consumer transaction cases. In these cases, the
already weak position of the consumer is weakened even further since the e-commerce
consumer bears the additional risk of the pre-payment requirement that is typical for a
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setting such as this one. The most influential international consumer group called the
Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD)449 points out this fact. It also adds that this
fact is only one reason why the seller or supplier will normally have little reason to sue
the consumer.450 Therefore, not permitting consumers to bring suit in the courts of their
home countries would mean “denying them their right to redress.”451 TACD further
argues that a choice of forum clause in a consumer contract should not be enforceable,
and that the Hague Convention must include language that creates the right for the
consumer to sue the business in the courts of the consumer’s home country.452
Only a Hague Convention that includes consumer contracts in general and
guarantees the possibility for the consumer to sue in the courts of his home country will
in the long term provide the right background not only for regular consumer transactions
but also for e-commerce consumer transactions. The adoption of a Brussels Regulation
style approach in a Hague Convention would surely lead to great opposition. However,
most of the arguments against the inclusion of language that is similar to that in the
Brussels Regulation is unfounded as addressed above and often bases on the influence of
different interest groups. Against the background that most of the e-commerce
transactions are typically of small monetary value, the additional establishment of
alternative dispute resolution schemes would also be a reasonable addition to the
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convention.453 Major changes would be necessary in order to include consumer contracts
in the way proposed above. Since the negotiating parties already have problems adopting
a convention with a very limited scope, one can have doubts whether the goal of
including consumer contracts will be reached in the negotiations of second stage issues if
there should be such negotiations later.

453
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The Hague Convention Project is over a decade old, while the idea of drafting a
convention with such content is even older. There are not many existing legal projects
that have such a long history and that have changed their content so often and so
dramatically. The reason for such extensive modifications is that all participating nations
and interest groups have had much influence on the project. The drafting process is not
yet over. Thus, drawing a conclusion seems premature. It is important, however, to
summarize what has been done so far and what should be done in the future.
The thesis made clear that the drafting process started out with an approach that
was very similar to the Brussels Convention and the Brussels Regulation (Council
Regulation No. 44/2001). However, the U.S. especially opposed such an approach for the
Hague Convention Project even though it was working well among the European states
for decades and provided a functioning system with respect to consumer protection. The
result of the unwillingness of the U.S. to adopt a Convention with a broad scope is a draft
that only applies in international cases to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded
in civil and commercial matters in the business-to-business setting. A narrow choice of
court convention in the business-to-business setting is a good start, but it disregards the
original goal of the Hague Conference. As described above, the proposed Convention
neither covers intellectual property matters nor e-commerce.
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The short-term goal of the negotiations of the Hague Convention is clear. In June
2005 the delegations will gather for a Diplomatic Conference. The result of this
Diplomatic Conference could be a Hague Convention that is ready to be signed and
ratified by the member states. Even if the negotiations last longer there is little danger
that the project will fail. The first step of drafting any convention, even a very narrow one
is the most important one. It will be the basis for further fine-tuning with respect to
second stage matters. If the negotiating parties subsequently broaden the convention, they
will have taken a desirable direction by starting small.
With respect to the second stage, it is evident that drafting a convention that is
intended to be accepted universally is not an easy task. However, this fact should not be
an excuse for excluding matters where regulation is not only important for the legal field
but also in the daily lives of the people. Progress with respect to the technical matters that
concern our daily activities has to be framed by laws and regulations that can face the
challenges of the twenty-first century without being outdated and impractical. The Hague
Conference could both be a tool to obtain proper jurisdiction by assigning disputes to the
right court and a means of making sure that judicial decisions are subject to recognition
and enforcement elsewhere. These objections are especially important in the two areas
that were subject to detailed discussion in this paper, namely intellectual property and ecommerce.
There can only be unification with respect to the intellectual property area if it is
included in a treaty on jurisdiction and enforcement that provides for as many nations as
possible to participate. While some could argue whether a separate convention on the
matter is more reasonable, the answer to this problem is clear. The Hague Convention is
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the ideal tool to unify the rules regarding jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement in the
intellectual property arena. Only the inclusion of all intellectual property rights in the
convention including questions of validity will provide certainty in the application and
use of this area of law. Intellectual property rights are closely connected with contractual
matters, for example. Therefore, a common treatment in one convention regulating
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments is not only reasonable but necessary.
In summary of the remarks regarding the e-commerce matter, it must be pointed
out that while a great deal has been done regarding business-to-business transactions the
additional inclusion of business-to-consumer relationships must be a major goal in the
second stage negotiations. The importance of the Hague Convention project will diminish
considerably if the business-to-consumer transactions are not included in its scope. If the
Hague Convention project wants to have a long lasting impact, it must include businessto-consumer contracts in the scope of the convention. Without this step, consumers all
over the world will become increasingly unprotected in a society of proliferating ecommerce. The only possibility to react is once more the Hague Convention. In facing
the challenges that new technologies create, countries should subordinate their national
interests under the broader idea of a regime that can lead to predictability, certainty, and
protection for weaker parties worldwide.
Without the inclusion of intellectual property rights and business-to-consumer ecommerce transaction issues into its scope, the Hague Convention, which is already
weakened by the narration of the treaty to choice of court clauses, will lose further
importance in the long run and face the danger of becoming meaningless. However, it is
not too late and the negotiations in the proposed second stage should make use of the
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foundation that will hopefully be created by the adoption of a new Hague Jurisdiction and
Judgments Convention after the June 2005 Diplomatic Conference. The second stage
negotiations will decide whether the project remains to be a small fish in the legal
aquarium or whether it grows to be one of the most important and biggest projects in
years. It is certainly possible to achieve the later alternative and to create a Hague
Convention that is acceptable worldwide. The adoption of a convention that is similar to
the April 2004 Draft after the June 2005 Diplomatic Conference would be a big step
towards a later Hague Convention with a wider scope. The drafting of such a wide
convention that includes all the approaches suggested in this thesis will depend on
whether the negotiating parties gather again to discuss the inclusion of second stage
issues after the adoption of a Convention in the April 2004 Draft style in June 2005.
Whether such negotiations will take place in the near future, however, can be drawn into
doubt since the parties had severe problems to even agree on a Convention in the present
form. The history of the negotiations behind the creation of the April 2004 Draft makes
this approach to an inflexible framework that is difficult to change. Hopefully, the
delegations did not miss the historic chance for drafting a broad treaty by favoring the
present approach. However, the present draft can be a good starting point for something
bigger, if delegations work together in a serious attempt to face the legal challenges that
are caused by our modern times.
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